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APPORTIONMENT IN NEW YORK
RUTH C. SILVA*
PART ONE: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAPPORTIONIENT
AND REDISTRICTING: BAKER v. CARR
'VIEN the United States Supreme Court recently announced its deci-
sion in the Tennessee apportionment case,' the Court probably
handed down its most important decision since Marbury v. Madison."
While Dred Scott,3 the Slaughter-House Cases;' and the segregation casesP
affected social relations, Baker v. Carr will affect the governmental power
structure by shifting the balance of state legislative power from rural
conservatives to city and suburban voters who tend to be sympa-
thetic toward social change and governmental intervention.0 Precisely
to what extent the Baker decision will ultimately shift legislative power
from the rural areas is still uncertain, because the Supreme Court declined
to say how unrepresentative a state legislature must be before a federal
court will hold its apportionment and districting to be unconstitutional.
It is possible, nevertheless, to find in Baker certain guideposts which,
though less certain than any mathematical formulae, will necessarily
* Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University. Diss Silva r,-d
as special consultant on legislative apportionment to the State of New Yorh Temporary
Commission on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, which w.as chaired
by Nelson Rockefeller before he became Governor in 1959 and vas chaired by former
Judge David W. Peck from 1959 until the Commission expired in 1961.
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 136 (1962). The petitioners contended that, among other
things, the Tennessee Legislature's failure to reapportion since 1901 denied them, as re-
dents of under-represented districts, an equal vote and, therefore, equal protection
of the laws. A three-judge district court met to decide the constitutionality of the Tcnne sce
statute (2S U.S.C. § 2231 (1953) requires that a district court, to enjoin the enforcement of a
state statute on constitutional grounds, must be composed of three judges) 175 F. Supp.
649 (A.D. Tenn. 1959). The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the federal
courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint had failed to
state a claim for which there was a feasible remedy. 179 F. Supp. 324 (AID. Tenn. 1959)
(per curiam).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1357).
4. 33 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1S73).
5. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
6. See Knowles, Study Details Rural Domination of Most Legislatures in Nation, N.Y.
Times, March 2S, 1962, p. 22, col. 1; Kroch, Apportionment Debate, N.Y. Times, April 3,
1962, § 4, p. 11, col. 1; Lewis, Decision on Reapportionment Points Up Urban-Rural Struggle,
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 4, p. 3, col. 1; Reston, Rural Areas Facing Lo-- of Political
Dominance, N.Y. Times, Mlarch 27, 1962, p. 1, col. 6. See also National Municipal League,
Compendium on Legislative Apportionment (2d ed. 1962); Rural Over-Reprezentation Acute
in State Legislatures, 20 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 170-78 (Feb. 2, 1962).
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be relied upon by subsequent courts faced with the constitutional aspects
of legislative apportionment.
While Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in Baker,
did not say that legislative districts must be equal in population in order
to be constitutional, he did speak of "arbitrary and capricious" district-
ing as violating the United States Constitution and remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether Tennessee's legislative districts
actually do violate the fourteenth amendment.' In his concurring opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Clark argued that numerical equality of representation
throughout the State is not required by the fourteenth amendment,
that geographic and other interests as well as population may be given
consideration in apportionment and districting statutes, and that un-
equal representation does not present a case of "invidious discrimi-
nation" if there is a rational explanation for such inequality.
8
The Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of Ten-
nessee's legislative districts. It merely held: (1) that the federal courts
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of legislative apportionment
and districting, (2) that a justiciable cause of action was stated upon
which the petitioners would be entitled to appropriate relief, and, (3)
that the petitioners were competent to challenge the Tennessee appor-
tionment and districting statutes.
To gauge the probable ramifications and effects of the tripartite
Baker decision, it is necessary to explore each of its three points
(federal jurisdiction, the constitutional cause of action, and the parties
entitled to relief) in the light of prior decisions in federal and state
courts. It is appropriate to consider, as well, the ancillary problems
created by the type of relief to be granted.
I. JURISDICTION
In holding that the federal courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Supreme Court found that the case raises a federal question
based upon allegations of a denial of equal protection of the laws con-
trary to the fourteenth amendment.9 Such a ruling merely represented
7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
8. - U.S. -. Mr. Justice Clark contended, however, that the magnitude and frequency of
the inequalities in Tennessee admit no rational policy whatever. Consequently, he favored
the Court's passing on the constitutionality of Tennessee's districts, which he described as a
"crazy quilt without rational basis." Id. at 254. Mr. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, ex-
pressly stated that he wished to imply no views on the merits since the trial court was the
proper place for such a finding of fact. Id. at 266. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan argued
that Tennessee's districts were not so "irrational" as to be unconstitutional. Id. at 340.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, on the other hand, offered a historical defense for basing
representation on geographic subdivisions with little or no regard for population statistics.
Id. at 266-330.
9. Id. at 237.
[Vol. 30
APPORTIONMENT
a logical and consistent extension of existing law since the Court had
previously exercised jurisdiction in several cases involving state laws
which divided a state into congressional districts.1" Moreover, the Su-
preme Court had never ruled that the federal courts lack jurisdiction
over the subject matter of apportionment or districting.11
Colegrove v. Green,12 decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, was a
four-to-three decision. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed found
that the Court lacked power to grant relief on the ground that districting
was a political question and that Congress had the exclusive power to
remedy a state legislature's unfairness in dividing the state into congres-
sional districts.' 3 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy thought not only
that jurisdiction existed and should be exercised, but also that the Court
could grant equitable relief. 4 The dispositive vote was cast by Mr.
Justice Rutledge, who thought that the Court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter but should not exercise its equity power because, among
other reasons, the imminence of the 1946 congressional elections pre-
cluded adoption of corrective measures before the election. 1c Thus, four
of the seven Justices thought that the federal courts have jurisdiction
over the subject matter but decided, in the exercise of their equitable
discretion, to withhold relief.'"
In various per curiam decisions since Colegrove, the Supreme Court
declined, for various reasons, to exercise its equity power in apportion-
ment, districting, and related cases, but never did it dismiss any of
these cases for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Two com-
panion cases were dismissed because they had become moot.1 T The
Court dismissed three other cases, either because it exercised its dis-
cretion not to review the case, or because there was a want of equity in
10. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). The Court expresy
refused to dismiss such a redistricting case "in view . . . of the subject-matter of the
controversy and the Federal characteristics which inhere in it... " but upheld the district-
ig law on its merits. Id. at 570. In three cases, the Court not only assumed jurisdiction but
ordered the election of congressmen in the state at large. Carroll v. Becker, 285 US. 3.0
(1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 2S5 U.S. 375 (1932) ; Smiley v. Holm, 235 U.S. 355 (1932).
11. For a discussion of the difference between apportionment and districting, cee note
S7 infra and accompanying text.
12. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
13. Id. at 552. "Each house shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifica-
tions of its own Members... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 5. Thus, Air. Justice Frankfurter used
a separation-of-powers argument to defer to Congress, a co-equal branch of the federal
government, in the matter of congressional districts. 32S U.S. 554.
14. Id. at 566-74 (dissenting opinion).
15. Id. at 565-66.
16. Thus, Colegrove was dismissed on alternative grounds: want of equity and exclusive
congressional power to deal with the problem. Id. at 553-54.
17. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam).
1962]
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the relief sought.' Four cases were dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question since the Court presumably found a rational justification
for the challenged law.'" Finally, the Court found in two other cases
that adequate state grounds barred review. Certainly, none of these
per curiam decisions held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Only two years after Colegrove, the Supreme Court, after taking
jurisdiction in a case which involved districting, held that the challenged
statute represented a rational state policy so that the petitioner's claim
was without merit.2 ' In 1950, the Court affirmed a lower court's dis-
missal of a case involving Georgia's county-unit system on grounds,
however, that assumed the lower court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter under the Civil Rights Act.22 This decision simply involved
the Court's refusal to exercise its equitable discretion. 8
Besides the Supreme Court's assumption of jurisdiction in various
apportionment, districting, and related cases, two lower federal courts
have taken jurisdiction in legislative apportionment cases2 4 and have
18. Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd per curiam, 361 U.S. 127
(1959); Hartsfield v. Sloane, 357 U.S. 916 (1958) (memorandum decision); Radford v. Gary,
145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
19. Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per curiam) ; Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors,
339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam) ; Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam).
In Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (per curiam) (appeal dismissed for lack of
federal question) the district court had dismissed because of lack of equity and because
the case had been prematurely brought since the petitioners bad failed to seek a remedy
in the state courts. 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951). Failure to seek a remedy in the
state courts presumably will not bar the federal courts from taking jurisdiction in
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) because the New York courts will
not hear challenges to the fairness of an apportionment on grounds other than the legislature's
violation of the state constitution's mandatory rules relating to apportionment and district-
ing. In re Burns, 268 N.Y. 601, 198 N.E. 424 (1935) (memorandum decision). For a
discussion of which rules are mandatory and which ar6 merely directive, see In re Richard-
son, 307 N.Y. 269, 121 N.E.2d 217 (1954); In re Tishman, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858
(1944); In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 205, 81 N.E. 124, 130 (1907). Nor will a state court's
inability to grant relief bar a federal court from assuming jurisdiction to inquire into an
alleged deprivation of a federal constitutional right. Cf. Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp.
184, 187 (D. Minn. 1958) (per curiam); Magraw v. Donovan, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn.
1959), aff'd sub. nom Rosso v. Magraw, 288 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Holm, 220
Minn. 486, 19 N.W.2d 914 (1945).
20. Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam); Anderson v. Jordan, 343
U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam).
21. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam).
22. The federal district court has been granted original jurisdiction in a civil action
to redress the deprivation by state law of any right of a citizen of the United States secured
by the United States Constitution or by federal statute. 62 Stat. 932 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1958).
23. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (per curiam).
24. Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958); Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp.
220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
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retained jurisdiction until the question was made moot by legislative
compliance. In 1956, the federal district court in Hawaii held that
it had equity jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act65 to grant relief
in a case involving the Hawaiian Territorial Legislature's failure to
reapportion. That court, however, distinguished judicial intervention
in the apportionment of a state legislature and of a territorial legis-
lature.26 Later, in 1959, the federal district court in Minnesota assumed
jurisdiction in a case in which the plaintiffs argued that the Minnesota
Legislature's failure to reapportion and redistrict violated the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act. 7 Although the court withheld deci-
sion in order to give the 1959 session of the legislature an opportunity to
reapportion and redistrict, it did retain jurisdiction and instructed the par-
ties that they might petition the court for the proper remedies within sixty
days after the legislature adjourned. Thereafter, when the legislature en-
acted a new reapportionment and districting statute, the plaintiffs asked for
dismissal, thereby depriving the United States Supreme Court of an oppor-
tunity to pass on the propriety of the lower court's assumption of jurisdic-
tion.2" Finally, on January 11, 1962, in an action in the district court for
25. 62 Stat. 932 (1943), 2S U.S.C. § 1343(3) (195S).
26. Dyer v. Abe, 13S F. Supp. 220, 234 (D. Hawaii 1956). On August 1, 1956, Congres
amended the Hawaiian Organic Act, enacted a reapportionment, declared that the eisting
apportionment should continue in force for the 2Sth (1955) and 29th (1957) legisatures,
and deleted from the Organic Act that portion of § 55 vhich directed the legilature to
reapportion its membership. On August 2, 1956, the federal district court, sua zponte, took
judicial notice of this congressional action and determined that the basis for the court's
prior order had been repealed. But the court also granted Dyer a declaratory decree of his
rights as they had existed prior to the amendment of the Organic Act. The decree, with
findings of fact and conclusions of law, was entered on December 28, 1956. On June 10,
195S, the ninth circuit court of appeals, ruled that the congressional enactment of the
reapportionment on August 1, 1956 had made Dyer's controversy over reapportionment
"moot," reversed the district court's declaratory decree, and ordered the complaint dis-
missed without prejudice. Abe v. Dyer, 256 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 195S) (per curiam). Sa
Lau, Reapportionment of the Territorial Legislature (Univ. of Hawaii Legis. Reference
Bureau Rep. No. 2) 9-11 (1953).
27. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 19S3 (1953). See Magraw, v. Donovan,
159 F. Supp. 901 (1958).
28. Magraw v. Donovan, 177 F. Supp. S03 (D. Alinn. 1959). The seats were last re-
apportioned and the state redistricted in 1913 on the basis of the 1910 census. From 1910
to 1950, the state's population and grown more than 43,to. The population of some
counties had grown as much as 1S5% vwhile several counties had actually lost popula-
tion. As a result, in 1950, senatorial districts ranged from 16,87S to 153,455 inhabitants
(a ratio of 9:1) while representative districts ranged from 7,290 to 107,246 (a ratio
of almost 15:1). Mlinn. Legis. Research Comm., Legislative Reapportionment (Publica-
tion No. 63, 1954). On the basis of the 1950 census, the new senatorial districts range from
27,716 to 70,492 while the number of inhabitants per representative ranges from 10,150 to
36,235. Short, Minnesota Adopts Reapportionment Act, 43 Natl Civic Rev. 415-16 (1959).
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the southern district of New York by a taxpayer challenging the state con-
stitutional provisions for apportionment, Judges Levet and Ryan denied
the motion to dismiss a New York apportionment case for lack of juris-
diction. 29 Thus it is apparent, by way of the foregoing examples, that
the federal courts have not considered themselves wanting in juris-
diction to decide the equities involved in districting and apportionment
cases although they have most frequently declined to exercise it.
Any doubts about the federal courts having equity jurisdiction
in apportionment and districting cases should have been resolved in
favor of jurisdiction after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.30 Since
this statute expressly gives the federal courts equity jurisdiction in cases
arising under any act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to vote; 3' since the right to vote includes the
right to have one's vote counted fairly;32 and, since inequitable appor-
tionment and districting prevent the votes in under-represented districts
from being counted fairly,3 apportionment and districting cases now
clearly fall within the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.84
29. Judges Levet, Ryan, and Waterman all agreed to dismiss the complaint, however,
both for want of a federal question and for want of equity in the relief sought. W.M.C.A.,
Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). On appeal, a statement regarding jurisdiction
was filed with the United States Supreme Court. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
See also Judge Levet's decision and order to convene the three-judge court. 196 F. Supp.
758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1958), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 1861 (1958), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 1975 a-e, 1995 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
31. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1958).
32. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238
U.S. 383, 384 (1915) (argument for United States).
33. In Tennessee, for example, Moore County has 3,454 inhabitants and one representa-
tive while Shelby County (Memphis) has 627,019 inhabitants and eight representatives
or 78,377 inhabitants per representative. U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Tennessee, Final
Rep. PC(1)-44B, at 29; Tennessee Blue Book 1960, at 196. Therefore, the petitioners In
Baker argued that one popular vote cast for a representative in Moore County has ap-
proximately twenty-two times the weight of one popular vote cast for a representative in
Shelby County. Their contention is correct, however, only if the ratio of voters to In-
habitants is approximately the same in Moore as in Shelby County. In New York, for
example, the average number of votes cast per hundred citizens in the four senatorial elec-
tions held under the present apportionment (1954-1960) ranged from 20.5 in the eleventh
senatorial district (part of Brooklyn) to 86.1 in the third senatorial district (part of Nassau
County). Because the ratio of voters to citizens is not the same in every county, one
popular vote cast for state senator in Manhattan and Brooklyn had 1.8 times the weight of
one popular vote cast for state senator of Nassau. (Computed by the author on the basis
of election statistics published in various editions of the New York Legislative Manual.) If
one popular vote in a district is to be equalized with one popular vote in any other district,
New York's apportionment would have to be based on electors rather than on citizen
population.
34. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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I. FEDERAL QuEsTION
The Supreme Court's finding of jurisdiction in Bakcr depended par-
tially on the Court's preliminary finding that the matter set forth in
the complaint presents a federal question. 5 Since four of the seven
Justices participating in Colegrove agreed not to exercise the Court's
equity power, that Court did not reach the constitutional question of
whether the fourteenth amendment protects against the kind of geo-
graphical discrimination that is involved in apportionment and districting
cases." Because the Supreme Court rather consistently declined to exer-
cise its equity power in apportionment, districting, and related cases that
arose after Colegrove, 7 the Michigan Supreme Court concluded incor-
rectly that the United States Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the
fourteenth amendment does not prohibit a state from establishing legis-
lative districts which result in substantial inequality of popular represen-
tationf s
In deciding the case of Gomihion v. Lightfootl on the basis of the
fifteenth amendment, the United States Supreme Court bypassed the
question of whether flagrant gerrymandering is the kind of "invidious
discrimination" which the fourteenth amendment forbids. In Gomilion,
the Court held invalid an Alabama statute which altered the boundaries
of the City of Tuskegee so that ninety-nine per cent of the city's Negroes
were gerrymandered out of the city. The state's affirmative action
in passing the statute was held to deprive Negroes of the right to vote
in municipal elections in violation of the fifteenth amendment. 0 Mr. Jus-
35. Id. at 199-2C0. The Court found that the subject matter set forth in the complaint
relates to denial of equal protection and falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
36. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). This suit was brought by three qualified voters who challenged
the constitutionality of the Illinois Law of 1901 dividing the State into congre-ional
districts, which were alleged to have become unfair by a shift of population and by the
legislature's failure to redistrict. See Note, The Role of the Judiciary in Legislative
Reapportionment, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 617 (195S).
37. See notes 17-20 supra.
38. Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960). Consequently, the 1ichign
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment was not violated by an amendment to
the Michigan constitution which permanently established the State's senatorial districts
virtually as they existed in 1925 and which, therefore, obviated the necessity for reapportion-
ment in accord with the previously extant constitutional mandate. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Kavanagh argued that Michigan's permanent senatorial districts violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because statistical evidence proves that this
arrangement gives greater weight to one elector's vote cast for state senator than it gives
to another elector's vote cast for state senator in a different district. 360 Mich. at 1, 104
N.W.2d at 63. On appeal, a statement regarding jurisdiction was filed with the United
States Supreme Court. 29 U.S.L. Week 3199 (Dec. 12, 1960).
39. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Whittaker argued that Gomillion should have been
1962]
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tice Frankfurter, who had written the opinion for the "bob-tailed major-
ity" in Colegrove, carefully distinguished Gomillion from Colegrove on
two grounds: (1) While the petitioners in Colegrove had invoked the
fourteenth amendment, Gomillion was decided on the basis of the fif-
teenth. (2) The alleged discrimination in Colegrove resulted from the
legislature's failure to act while Gomillion involved affirmative legislative
action.4 Citing Gomillion, a three-judge federal statutory court recently
dismissed a New York apportionment case for want of a federal question
on the ground that the fourteenth amendment does not protect against
geographical discrimination, and that the petitioners did not allege that
the New York constitution's apportionment formulae and districting rules
discriminated against either Negro voters (fifteenth amendment) or
women voters (nineteenth amendment).4
On the other hand, in 1956, the federal district court in Hawaii had
ruled that the Hawaiian Territorial Legislature's failure to reapportion
denied equal protection to voters in the more populous legislative
decided on the basis of the fourteenth amendment since the legislature's action amounted
to unconstitutional segregation. He also argued that no voting rights were abridged since
Negroes continue to vote and have their votes counted in the district where they live.
Id. at 349. Mr. Justice Whittaker did not participate in Baker, but Mr. Justice Frankfurter
used his line of reasoning to argue that voting rights were not impaired in Baker. 369 U.S.
186, 298-300.
41. State courts have consistently refused to invalidate an apportionment or districting
statute that was valid when enacted but became unfair only through the passage of time.
E.g., Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941); Smith v. Holm, 220
Minn. 486, 19 N.W.2d 914, 30 Minn. L. Rev. 37 (1945); State ex rel. Warson v. Howell,
92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916). Similarly, they have generally taken jurisdiction in
apportionment and districting cases only when the challenged statute has not yet been
used as the basis of an election. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, refused
to entertain a taxpayer's action testing the validity of the act of 1907 and held that the
petitioner was barred by laches in waiting until four general elections had been held
under the act before challenging its validity. In re Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 430, 441-42, 96 N.E.
87, 89 (1911). See also Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61, 102 S.W. 861 (1907). But state
courts have occasionally invalidated a recent apportionment or districting statute which
violated state constitutional mandates. E.g., Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d
315 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Donovan v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 55, 113 N.E. 740 (1916); Giddings v. Blacker,
93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); In re Tishman, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858 (1944); In re
Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916); In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124
(1907); People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893);
Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440,
51 N.W. 724, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).
42. The petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1958) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958), and alleged that the appor-
tionment and districting provisions of the New York constitution denied them both due
process and equal protection contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. See note 29 supra.
APPORTIONMENT
districts.43 Similarly, a superior court in Indiana recently held that the
Indiana Legislature's failure to reapportion for forty years violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.44 As a matter of
fact, the federal district court in Baker v. Carr thought that the Tennes-
see Legislature's failure to reapportion violates the fourteenth amendment
but dismissed the complaint on other grounds." By finding that failure
to reapportion raises a federal question and by remanding the Baker
case to the district court, the Supreme Court has now given the district
court an opportunity to convert its views on the constitutionality of
Tennessee's legislative districts into a judicial ruling.
III. JUSTICIABILITY AND STANDING
Because the judicial power of the United States extends only to cases
and controversies,"0 the federal courts cannot decide nonjusticiable
political questions. In Baker v. Cart, the Court reasoned that a "polit-
ical question" was not presented merely because the appellants sought
to protect "political rights" against a state's "political action." The
Court went on to conclude that the case involved a bona fide controversy
-whether "political action" was depriving the appellants of a constitu-
tionally protected right. Since the petitioners alleged that Tennessee's
districting statutes disfavor them vis-t-vis voters in irrationally favored
counties, and, since the United States Constitution protects a citizen's
right to vote against impairment by arbitrary state action, the Court held
that a justiciable question was presented."7
Of course, the federal courts cannot enforce the constitutional clause
which guarantees to the states "a republican form of government."45
Because the petitioners in Baker might have based their claims on
the guaranty clause and because reliance on the guaranty clause would
have made their cause nonjusticiable, it does not follow that the pe-
43. Dyer v. Abe, 133 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
44. The Marion County Court held that the legislature's failure to reapportion violates
not only the fourteenth amendment but also the Northwest Ordinance's guarantee of
"proportionate representation of the people in the legislature" as vxll as the congresonal
guarantees of "a republican form of government" made by various acts of CongreZ3 or-
ganizing the Indiana Territory and admitting Indiana to the Union. Grills v. Andcr-on, 29
U.S.L. Week 2443 (larch 2S, 1961).
45. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
46. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
47. 369 U.S. at 207-03.
48. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. See Highland Farms Dairy Inc. v. Agnew, 300 US. 6Q, 612
(1937); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 2S1 U.. 370, 374 (1930); Ohio ex re.
Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 231 U.S. 74, 79-20 (1930); Ohio ax rel. Davis v.
Hlldebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 US. 113 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 43 U.. (7 Horw.) 1
(1849) ; see note 44 supra.
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titioners may not be heard on an equal-protection claim.40 In previous
cases, the nonjusticiability of a claim resting on the guaranty clause did
not bar the justiciability of the same claim when it was presented
under the fourteenth amendment if the claim of constitutional depriva-
tion was amenable to judicial correction. 0 Nor would the Court accept
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument in Baker that the Court could not
determine the equal-protection issue without first determining what
constitutes a "republican form of government."'"
The Court rejected not only the guaranty-clause argument but all
other arguments that had been offered in support of the proposition
that Baker presented a "political question." The Court found, for ex-
ample, that the "political-question" argument of Colegrove was ir-
relevant in Baker because the power to decide questions relating to
the apportionment and districting of state legislatures is not vested in
a political branch of the federal government.52 Further, the Court con-
tended that the issue in Baker was not a political one, because the
judicial standards under the equal protection clause are sufficient to
allow a court to determine, on the particular facts, whether the dis-
crimination reflects a reasonable state policy or is simply arbitrary and
capricious.
5 3
In order to be a "case or controversy" in the constitutional sense,
not only must a justiciable question be presented, but the proceeding
must have bona fide litigants who have legal rights at stake. Since the
right asserted in Baker was found to be within judicial protection
under the fourteenth amendment, the Court argued that the petitioners
have a substantial personal stake, sufficient to assure the adverse inter-
ests necessary for a "case or controversy." Consequently, the appellants
were held to have standing sufficient to maintain the suit and, there-
fore, to be entitled to a trial and a decision on the merits. According to
Mr. Justice Brennan, Colegrove v. Green "squarely held that voters who
allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have
standing to sue."54
Thus did Baker v. Carr dispose of the questions of a possible violation
of the fourteenth amendment by state districting and apportioning, of
the Court's jurisdiction to consider such a violation, and of the standing
49. 369 U.S. at 209-10.
50. The Court cited the following examples: Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S.
135 (1892); Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U.S. 201 (1884); Kennard v. Louisiana
ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1876).
51. 369 U.S. at 228-29.
52. See note 14 supra.
53. 369 U.S. at 209.
54. Id. at 206.
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necessary for a party to be entitled to relief. The Court did not consider,
however, what was to be the nature and extent of the relief so that
any prognosis of what form such relief is to take must come from a
consideration of prior cases identical with, or analogous to, the situation
presented in Baker.
IV. REMEDIES
The majority in Baker did not consider the question of possible
remedies; it simply stated: "We have no cause... to doubt [that] the
District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional
rights are found.... ."' The petitioners prayed that, unless and until
the Tennessee Legislature enacts a valid reapportionment and redistrict-
ing statute, the district court either order the defendants to conduct
legislative elections at large or reapportion by arithmetic application
of the Tennessee constitution's apportionment formula to the 1960 cen-
sus figures. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clark suggested that
the district court might do some redistricting as well as some reappor-
tioning. He proposed that the district court might start with the existing
districts, consolidate some of them, and assign the seats thus released
to the most under-represented counties6 (Without further prompting,
a Vermont court immediately began to partially reapportion the Vermont
Senate.)57
Concomitant with the Court's assumption and exercise of equity
jurisdiction in apportionment and districting cases is its power to rule
upon the constitutionality of any substituted districting or apportion-
ment plan. From Mr. Justice Clark's language, it would seem that the
Court might be willing to take a more active role and might engage
itself in actual apportionment and redistricting. At the very least, the
Baker decision has made it clear that the federal courts will act in
a supervisory way in restraining or enforcing any such plan by way of
injunction.
The Supreme Court's mistake in establishing the federal judiciary as
the "Nation's school board, '"58 however, is no valid argument for trans-
55. Id. at 193.
56. Id. at 251-64.
57. He not only enjoined two counties from electing state senators until the Vermont
Senate is reapportioned but also ordered the transfer of one senator from Chittenden
County to Rutland County, thereby reducing Rutland's senators from four to three and
increasing Chittenden's from four to five. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1962, p. 14, col. 4.
58. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Moreover, since racial segregation
is unconstitutional (see note 5 supra), one may question the constitutional propriety of
a district court's presiding over the perpetuation of even partial segregation while the local
school authorities formulate and implement plans for "a prompt and reasonable start
toward" gradual desegration with "all deliberate speed." Id. at 3C0-01.
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forming the federal courts into the "Nation's apportionment commission."
To restrain school boards, apportioners, and districters from violating
the fourteenth amendment is a valid judicial function. But to supervise
desegregation, to reapportion, and to redistrict are quite different func-
tions. In cases where the state constitution prescribes an apportionment
formula such as major fractions or equal proportions that admits no
discretion, the courts may be able to engage in some reapportioning
without becoming involved in the "mathematical quagmire,""0 of which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke. But if the courts reapportion in states
where the apportionment formula is not so precise or where the appor-
tionment formula itself is discriminatory or if the courts themselves begin
to redistrict, they are certain to become trapped in the "political
thicket," 60 against which Mr. Justice Frankfurter also warned.
Although the constitutions of Arkansas,"' Oregon, 2 and Texas 3 ex-
pressly provide for state judicial participation in reapportionment and
redistricting, the courts of other states have consistently and wisely
refused to reapportion or redistrict" or to order the legislature to do so."
In the six states where reapportionment and redistricting are vested in a
nonlegislative agency, however, the state courts can use mandamus or
injunction, not only to compel reapportionment and redistricting, but also
to compel such an agency to adhere to standards of fair representation-
Alaska,66 Arizona,67 Arkansas, 6 Hawaii, 0 Missouri,70 and Ohio.7'
59. 369 U.S. at 268.
60. Colegrove v. Greene, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
61. Ark. Const. amend. XXIII, § 5 empowers the state supreme court to revise an
apportionment or districting made by the State Board of Apportionment. The Arkansas
Supreme Court exercised this power in 1941 and again in 1952. Pickens v. Board of Ap-
portionment, 220 Ark. 145, 246 S.W.2d 556 (1952); Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153
S.W.2d 415 (1941). See also Butler v. Democrat State Comm., 204 Ark. 14, 160 S.W.2d 494
(1942) ; Sears, Methods of Apportionment 25-30 (1952).
62. Ore. Const. art. IV, § 6.
63. Texas Const. art. ITI, § 28.
64. E.g., Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 51 So. 2d 869 (1951); Romang v. Cordell, 206
Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677 (1952); Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 172 P.2d 397 (1946);
Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1943).
65. E.g., Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926); People ex rel. Woodyatt
v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 475, 40 N.E. 307, 314 (1895) ; State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock,
241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912). See Comment, Legislative Reapportionment, 1949 Wis.
L. Rev. 761, 762-63. State courts have also declined to compel indirectly reapportionment
and redistricting by refusing to order the state treasurer to withhold legislators' salaries
until the legislature reapportioned and by refusing to permit the legislature's action or
inaction to be tested in quo warranto proceedings. People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342
Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930) ; Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928).
66. Alaska Const. art. VI, § 11.
67. Arizona's Secretary of State performs the ministerial function of apportioning mem-
bers of the lower house according to the constitutional formula while the County Boards of
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It appears quite obvious that the federal courts cannot enjoin or
issue a writ of mandamus against a governor or a legislature or a state
supreme court. By way of example, in 1957, the United States Supreme
Court found a want of equity in the relief sought by the appellants in
an Oklahoma case and affirmed the federal district court's refusal to
issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor to call a session of
the legislature, to compel the legislature to reapportion, and to compel the
state supreme court to reapportion if the legislature failed to do so.-- When
the state courts have nullified an apportionment or districting act, they
have usually used mandamus73 or injunction 4 to order ministerial offi-
cers to refrain from carrying out the provisions of the invalid statute. 3
Supervisors divide their respective counties into representative districts. Ariz. Const. art. IV,
pt. 2, § 1. Board of Supervisors v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P.2d 1220 (1936). There is no
constitutional provision for senatorial reapportionment and redistricting.
6S. Ark. Const. amend. XXIII, § 5. Smith v. Board of Apportionment, 219 Ark.
611, 243 S.W.2d 755 (1951); Bailey v. Abington, 201 Ark. 1072, 143 S.W2d 176 (1941).
See also Carpenter v. Board of Apportionment, 213 Ark. 404, 236 S.W.2d 532 (1951).
69. Hawaii Const. art. MII, § 4.
70. Mlissouri's Secretary of State performs the ministerial function of apportioning
representatives while the local authorities divide their respective counties into reprzcn-tative
districts. Mlo. Const. art. MI, §§ 2-3. The Senatorial Apportionment Commission combines
the less-populous counties into senatorial districts but merely apportions senators to the
more-populous counties. Any city or county entitled to more than one senator is divided
into senatorial districts by the local authority in said town or county. Mo. Cont. art. MII,
§§ 7-S. See Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mlo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427 (1955). On use of mandamus
in such cases, see State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 347 Mo. 469, 147 S.W.2d 1C5 (1941).
71. Ohio Const. art. M, § 11. See State ex rel. Herbert v. Bricker, 139 Ohio St.
499, 41 N.E.2d 377 (1942).
72. Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), afi'd per curiam, 352 Us.
991 (1957).
73. E.g., Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 55, 113 N.E.
740 (1916); Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1S92); State ex rcl. Harte v.
Moorhead, 99 Neb. 527, 156 N.W. 1067 (1916); State ex rel. Morris v. Wrightson, 56
N.JL. 126, 28 Atl. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1893); People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138
N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. S27 (1893); State e-x rel Peterson v. Scott, 56 S.D. 144, 227 N.W. 572
(1929).
74. E.g., Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson,
125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. S65 (1907); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.. 724, 83
Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1392). See also Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts,
37 Il. L. Rev. 20, 34-35 (1942).
75. When the New York Legislature failed to reapportion for more than two decades,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the state courts had power neither to order the
election of senators and assemblymen at-large until a new apportionment was enacted nor
to enjoin the secretary of state and local boards of elections from conducting elections for
the choice of senators and assemblymen until after the legislature reapportioned nor to
mandamus the secretary of state and local boards to permit a county to elect the increased
number of senators and assemblymen to which that county would be entitled under the
most recent census. In re Bums, 263 N.Y. 601, 193 N.E. 424 (1935) (memorandum de-
cision).
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It would appear that mandamus and injunction would be available to
federal courts also, at least to the same extent and with the same
effectiveness as they have been used by state courts. Thus the federal
courts presumably can enjoin election officials from conducting legis-
lative elections in districts or can issue writs of mandamus compelling
such ministerial officers to conduct legislative elections at large until
a statute providing fair representation is enacted .7  For example, in
three instances, the United States Supreme Court has ordered the
election at large of congressmen in a state.77 Since no legislator is likely
to be anxious to entrust his fate to the tender mercies of a statewide
electorate, a court order requiring all of a state's legislators to be
elected at large would doubtless induce a delinquent legislature to re-
apportion and redistrict in short order. This appears to have been the
result in states, not only where a court has actually ordered the elec-
tion at large of all legislators, 78 but also where the mere possibility of
such a court order threatened.79
Mr. Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Baker suggested that the Court
would not, or should not, intervene in states where popular initiative
and referendum provide the voters with a "practical opportunity" for
correcting an existing "invidious discrimination."8 0 Twenty states have
provisions for passage of legislation by popular initiative and referen-
dum.8 Although the constitutional initiative has occasionally been used
to revise the so-called apportionment article of a state constitution
without the legislature's consent, 2 the statutory initiative has been used
successfully to force reapportionment and redistricting on an unwilling
76. Cf. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1930); Work v.
United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1923); Roberts
v. United States ex rel. Valentine, 176 U.S. 221, 231 (1900).
77. See note 10 supra.
78. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Hume
v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (ED. Ky. 1932); Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105
(1932); see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
1057, 1070, 1087-89 (1958).
79. See notes 26 and 28 supra; Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d
705 (1960); N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1961, p. 1, col. 2.
80. 369 U.S. at 258-59.
81. Thirteen states have popular initiative for proposing both statutes and constitutional
amendments: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Seven states have popular
initiative for proposal of statutes only: Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Montana, South Dakota,
Utah, and Washington. Baker, Reapportionment and Redistricting of State Legislatures 94
(National Municipal League 1959). One might question whether initiative and referendum
could be used to reapportion and redistrict in those states where the power to reapportion
and redistrict is not vested in the legislature.
82. Id. at 89-92.
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legislature only twice: in Washington in 1930Va and in Colorado in
1932.84
Washington's popularly initiated measure of 1930 corrected serious
inequalities that had arisen during thirty years of the legislature's
refusal to reapportion and redistrict. But a similar popularly initiated
and ratified reapportionment occurring in 1956 was amended radically
by the legislature, and the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
legislature's reapportionment over the popularly initiated one.5 In
Colorado, on the other hand, the state supreme court upheld the popu-
larly initiated apportionment over the legislature's subsequent reap-
portionment. Despite these two successful uses of popular initiative and
referendum to force reapportionment and redistricting on a reluctant
legislature, the failure of most such effortss° raises a serious question;
namely, whether popular initiative and referendum actually do provide
the voters with a "practical opportunity" for correcting "invidious dis-
crimination."
PART TWO: APPORTIONMENT OF THE NEW YORK SENATE
The 1960 census tabulations of New York State's citizen population
are completed, and the 1963 session of the legislature will have the duty
of reapportioning the State's fifty or more senators among the several
counties. This raises certain questions about the meaning of article III of
the New York constitution relating to representation in the legislature.
A systematic investigation of legislative representation requires one to
distinguish between apportionment and districting. Since this article is
concerned with apportionment, it deals with the rules that govern the
distribution of senators among the counties, between the upstate and the
downstate, and among the urban, suburban, and rural areas. A districting
study, on the other hand, would be concerned largely with the rules gov-
erning and the practices followed in drawing the boundaries of legislative
districts.
Perhaps this distinction between apportionment and districting can
best be explained by the use of several illustrations. The present con-
stitutional provision precluding a county from having four or more
senators unless such county has at least two per cent of the state's citizen
population for each senator, is, for example, an apportionment rule. The
present constitutional prohibition against a senate district's containing
83. See State ex reL Miller v. finkle, 156 Wash. 2S9, 286 Pac. S39 (1930).
84. Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934).
85. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Mleyers, 51 Wash. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 823 (1957). Se also
State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wash. 2d 410, 302 P.2d 202 (1956).




parts of two counties, on the other hand, is a districting rule. In the case
of assembly representation, the present constitution makes a sharp
distinction between apportionment and districting by vesting the two
functions in different bodies. The legislature has the sole power to
apportion assemblymen, but the local authorities have exclusive power to
divide their respective counties into assembly districts.8 7 In the case
of the senate, however, the legislature has the power not only to appor-
tion but also to district. Indeed, apportionment and districting are in-
separably joined in the method prescribed for distributing senators to
the less populous areas of the State.
The legislature actually performs four functions with respect to sena-
torial apportionment and districting: (1) apportions senators to each
county that has at least six per cent of the State's total citizen popula-
tion, (2) divides each of these counties into a number of senatorial
districts equal to the number of senators to which that county is en-
titled, (3) determines the total number of senators to be apportioned,
and (4) divides the remainder of the State into a number of senatorial
districts equal to the number of senators yet to be apportioned. The first
and third functions are essentially apportionment functions. The second
involves only districting. But the fourth function involves both appor-
tionment and districting. That is, the legislature apportions senators to
the less populous areas of the State by dividing them into senatorial
districts.
Contrary to popular notion, not all unequal representation is caused
by gerrymandering-that is, by abuse of legislative discretion in drawing
the boundaries of legislative districts. Use of an area base, such as the
guarantee of at least one assemblyman to each county, for example, is
not gerrymandering but results in districts that are unequal in popula-
tion. As this article will show, a combination of the present constitutional
provisions with the simple laws of arithmetic requires that some sena-
torial districts have at least fifty per cent more inhabitants than others,
but this practice presumably is constitutional and certainly cannot be
called gerrymandering. 8 Since the present article is concerned only with
87. Each county is entitled to at least one assemblyman. A county having only one
assemblyman constitutes one assembly district by itself and, therefore, cannot be divided
into assembly districts. "In any county entitled to more than one member [of the Assembly],
the board of supervisors, and in any city embracing an entire county and having no board
of supervisors, the common council, or if there be none, the body exercising the powers of
a common council, shall ... divide such counties into assembly districts .. . ." N.Y. Const.
art. III, § 5. (1894).
88. A gerrymander may be defined as "the formation of election districts, on another
basis than that of single and homogeneous political units as they existed previous to the . ..
[districting or redistricting], with boundaries arranged for partisan advantage." Griffith, The
Rise and Development of the Gerrymander 21 (1907). Thus, gerrymandering involves the
creation of arbitrary districts with artificial boundaries, which are consciously drawn for
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apportionment, the abuse of legislative discretion in drawing the bound-
aries of senatorial districts will not be considered. While constitutional
provisions relating to districting are only of marginal interest, an ex-
amination of the apportionment rules found in New York's first three
constitutions is essential to an understanding of the present constitu-
tion's provisions relating to apportionment.
I. T~M CONSTITUTIONS OF 1777, 1821, AND 1846
The constitution of 1777 established a senate of twenty-four mem-
bers,"9 divided the State into four great senatorial districts, and dis-
tributed the senators among them, giving nine to the southern, six
to the middle, six to the western, and three to the eastern district.0
The constitution provided for a census of senate electors to be taken as
soon as possible after the expiration of seven years following the end
of the war and directed the legislature to reapportion the senators among
the districts so that the number of senators would be "justly propor-
tioned" to the number of electors in each district.'
In 1791, following the first census, the districts were altered and
the seats reapportioned. 2 The legislature was also authorized to give
an additional senator to a district whenever a septennial census showed
that the number of electors in that district had increased one twenty-
fourth part of the whole number of electors as established by the first
census.93 Consequently, after the second census, the senate was increased
to forty-three members, the districts redrawn, and the senators appor-
tioned to the four newly constituted districts." Five years later, in 1801,
the legislature again redistricted but did not reapportion. 3
Later that year, a constitutional amendment fixed the number of
senators at thirty-two and directed the legislature to apportion these
partisan advantage. There are two methods of gerrymandering: (1) spreading the op-
position party's vote among the various districts so that the opposition can carry few, if
any, districts; (2) concentrating the opposition party's vote in a few districts so that the
opposition's popular support will be dissipated in the form of large margins in thece few
districts. Id. at 15-21.
89. N.Y. Const. art. X (1777); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United States 1334 (2d ed. 1S7S) [hcrdnaftcr
cited as 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions (2d ed. 1S7)].
90. N.Y. Const. art. XH (1777).
91. Ibid.
92. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1791, ch. 4.
93. N.Y. Cost. art. XI (1777). Senate electors were "the freeholders of this State,
possessed of Freeholds of the value of one hundred pounds over and above all Debts
and Incumbrances thereon." 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 516 (19cG).
See also Dougherty, Constitutional History of the State of New York 50-51 (2d rev. Cd. 1915).
94. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1796, ch. 19.
95. N.Y. Sess. Laws 101, ch. 125.
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senators among the four districts "as nearly as may be, according to the
number of electors qualified to vote for senators."9 Therefore, in 1802,
the legislature apportioned on the basis of thirty-two senators but did
not redistrict.17 In 1808, the legislature again reapportioned without
redistricting." When the legislature attempted to gerrymander the
senate districts in 1809, the council of revision vetoed the bill on the
ground that the constitution said nothing about the formation of new
districts.9 The constitution did not say, the council argued, "that the
districts shall be apportioned to the senate, but that senators shall be
apportioned amongst the great districts," presumably as these districts
stood.' After the next census, however, the legislature not only re-
apportioned but also redistricted.''
During the forty-four years from 1777 to 1821, a census was taken
five times-1790, 1795, 1801, 1807, and 1814. The legislature passed
six so-called reapportionment acts, redistricted on four occasions, reap-
portioned the seats on five occasions, and added forty-one new counties
to the various districts as those counties were created. 10 2 Although the
acts of 1791 and 1801 made the number of the senators quite dispropor-
tionate to the number of electors, these electors were too few to be statis-
96. N.Y. Const. amend. III (1801); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1340
(2d ed. 1878).
97. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1802, ch. 81, § 1, which apportioned the eight senators to be chosen
at the next election, giving one to the southern, two to the middle, and five to the western
district.
98. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 90, § 1, which apportioned the nine senators that were to
be chosen at the next election, giving two to the southern, one to the middle, one to the
eastern, and five to the western district.
99. N.Y. Const. amend. IV (1801).
100. The census was taken in 1807 and the senate reapportioned in 1808. To the surprise
of the Democrats, both the middle and eastern districts voted Federalist in the elections that
followed. Consequently, the Democratic legislature proposed to move Federalist Albany
and Rensselaer from the eastern to the middle district. The bill also provided for trans-
ferring Montgomery, Herkimer, St. Lawrence, Lewis, Jefferson, and Oneida from the
western to the eastern district in order to make the latter Democratic. Thus, the middle
district would have been overwhelmingly Federalist and the other three would have been
safely Democratic. In addition to objecting on the constitutional ground, the council also
objected on two grounds of policy: (1) that the senate had been reapportioned only the
preceding April and (2) that the eastern district had obviously been arranged to elect
Democratic senators. The council noted that the counties proposed to be unified (Washing-
ton, Saratoga, Essex, Clinton, Franklin and the six listed above) were distant from each
other, had separate local interests, and had never been united. As a matter of history, the
assembly failed to re-pass the bill by a vote of 46 to 51. Griffith, The Rise and Development
of the Gerrymander 59-61 (1907).
101. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1815, ch. 160, which apportioned the eight senators whose terms
expired July 1, 1815, giving two to the middle, four to the eastern, and two to the western
district. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1815, ch. 208 redrew the districts.
102. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 168-75 (1906).
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tically significant. While the last three apportionment acts made the num-
ber of senators relatively proportional to the number of electors in each
district, this fact does not necessarily mean that the districts may not
have been drawn for partisan advantage.'0 3 In any case, no area was con-
sistently discriminated against. If any area was favored, it was the east-
ern-Washington, Saratoga, Warren, Essex, etc. If any district was under-
represented, it was the western-Madison, Oneida, etc. In terms of the
relation between the number of senators and the number of electors, cer-
tainly the downstate (southern district) was neither over-represented nor
under-represented.
The constitution of 1821 changed the basis of senatorial representa-
tion from electors to "inhabitants, excluding aliens, paupers, and persons
of colour not taxed.""' The constitution continued the number of sena-
tors at thirty-two but increased the number of senatorial districts from
four to eight and, by assigning four seats to each district, deprived the
legislature of its authority to apportion senators among the districts.105
The legislature was authorized, however, to redistrict at the first session
after each decennial census so "that each senate district shall contain,
as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, excluding aliens,
paupers, and persons of colour not taxed. .... "'l
103. In his catalog of gerrymanders from 1705 to 1840, Griffith lists no gerrymanders
of senatorial districts in New York except one unsuccessful attempt. Griffith, The Rise and
Development of the Gerrymander 59-61 (1907). The legislature was sdllful, however, at
the art of gerrymandering congressional districts. In passing the Congressional Districting
Act of 1789, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1789, ch. 12, the Federalist senate gerrymandered Dutche.zs
and Westchester (second and third districts) to prevent anti-Federalist Dutchez: from
electing a congressman. After inspecting the election returns, the legislature reconstituted
the congressional districts in 1792 and again in 1797. After the federal census of I800, the
legislature seems to have been seized by a mania for congressional redistricting and altered
these districts in 1801, 1S02, 1S04, and 1SOS. After studying the election returns for 103,
the Democrats attempted a congressional gerrymander par excellence in IM39 but failed
to get their bill enacted. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Following the federal
census of 1810, the Democratic legislature combined the noncontiguous counties of Madison
and Herkimer into the seventeenth congressional district. It also established a double-
member district (the first) which included Suffolk, Queens, Kings, Richmond, and the firzt
two wards of New York City. The Democratic counties were counted on to offset the
Federalist vote in the city and, thereby, insure the election of two Democratic congrez-men.
As a matter of fact, from 1801 to 1312, Federalist New York City was consistently repre-
sented in Congress by Democrats, because the various vards of the city were joined vith
Democratic counties and placed in different congressional districts. Griffith, The rie and
Development of the Gerrymander 42-43, 56-59, 77-79 (l07).
104. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (1321); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
1341 (2d ed. 1373).
105. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 5 (1321). This was apparently designed to limit the tempta-
tion to gerrymander. See Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander 97, 123
(1907).
106. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (1821); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
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Although the convention used the federal census of 1820 as a basis
for dividing the State into senatorial districts, the constitution provided
for a state enumeration in 1825 and every ten years thereafter. 07 The
legislature passed three redistricting laws under the second constitution-
one in 1826,... another in 1836,1 and a third in 1846.110 From the stand-
point of population as a basis of representation, the senate districts were
drawn quite equitably-probably as equitably as possible since the
districts had to be composed of contiguous territory and since counties
could not be split between districts."' While these two rules may have
limited or prevented gerrymandering, they also prevented the legislature
from creating districts that were precisely equal in population. Again,
there seems to have been no discrimination against the downstate dis-
tricts (first and second districts) in favor of the more rural areas." 2
1341 (2d ed. 1878). See also Dougherty, Constitutional History of the State of New
York 113-14 (2d rev. ed. 1915).
107. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (1821); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
1341 (2d ed. 1878).
108. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1826, ch. 289.
109. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1836, ch. 436.
110. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1846, ch. 328.
111. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (1821); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
1341 (2d ed. 1878).
112. SENATE REDISTRICTING UNDER CoNsTmuTioN or 1821a
Number of Inhabitants (excluding aliens, paupers, and colored
Number of persons not taxed) per Senatorb
District Senatorsa 1821C 1826 1836 1846
First 4 40,690 47,429 64,782 77,019
Second 4 42,477 50,306 60,881 76,682
Third 4 42,146 45,300 62,621 77,735
Fourth 4 41,088 46,513 64,287 80,009
Fifth 4 41,338 48,044 66,335 74,260
Sixth 4 42,297 49,073 65,238 74,985
Seventh 4 40,876 46,430 62,354 66,810
Eighth 4 38,750 49,819 64,139 72,389
Total Ratio a  32 41,176 47,864 63,829 74,986
Variatione 00 3,727 5,006 5,454 13,199
Per cent variation 00 9.05% 10.5% 8.5% 17.6%
a The constitution provided for eight districts and assigned four senate seats to each.
Thus, the legislature had power to redistrict but not to reapportion.
b Computed from statistics in 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 177-81
(1906).
c Districts drawn by constitutional convention.
d Ratio equals state's representative population divided by 32.
o Difference between largest and smallest number of electors per senator.
f The variation divided by the ratio.
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The constitution of 1846 departed from the traditional rule by pro-
viding for single-member rather than multi-member districts. The con-
vention divided all of the State outside New York County into twenty-
eight districts, apportioned the other four senators to New York County,
and directed the County Board of Supervisors to divide that county into
four senatorial districts. Thus, there were thirty-two districts, each having
one senator." 3 The legislature had two pertinent powers under this
constitution: the power to apportion senators to the counties entitled
to more than one senator and the power to divide these counties and
the rest of the state into single-member districts.' The legislature ap-
portioned senators to the multi-member counties and redistricted the
state in 1857,1 1866,110 1879,1 7 and again in 1892.118
Although the constitution provided that each senatorial district should
contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of representative inhabi-
tants, there were greater population differences between the districts
created by these statutes than there had been under previous constitu-
tions."' These population differences, however, resulted from districting
113. N.Y. Const. art. MI, § 3 (1846); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 13S4
(2d ed. 1878).
114. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1846), which actually empowered the legislature only to
alter the senatorial districts after the return of each enumeration and said nothing about
apportionment to the counties entitled to more than one senator. Since New York County
was the only county entitled to more than one senator in 1846, § 3 authorized only
the New York County Board of Super%isors to dhide the county into senatorial districts
and to do so only on or before Mlay 1, 1847. Nothing was said about the authority of any
County Board of Superisors to redistrict in the future. Sections 3 and 4 were interpreted
to mean that the legislature was not only empowered to apportion senators to such counties
but also to divide these counties into senatorial districts. Consequently, the legilature re-
districted New York, Kings, and Erie counties under this constitution. See also 2 Poore, The
Federal and State Constitutions 1354-55 (2d ed. 1878).
115. N.Y. Ses. Laws 1857, ch. 339.
116. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1866, ch. 805.
117. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1879, ch. 203.
118. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 397.
119. SEzNA.T Dismcrs U.ND.R T Co=sTrrruno. or 1846
Number of Inhabitants (excluding aliens and colored
persons not taxed) per Seato
Explanation 1846b 1857 1866 1879 1892
Largest District 91,052 103,561 134,364 180,703 229,005
Smallest District 58,671 61,811 84,373 101,327 152,3570
'Variationd 32,391 41,750 49,9S6 79,376 76,48
Ratioe 74,986 87,419 106,041 136,584 1C0,955
Per cent of Variationt 43.2 47.8 47.1 53.1 42.4
(Continued at bottom of next page)
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rather than from misapportionment. All five apportionment acts passed
under this constitution gave every county having one or more ratios a
senator for each ratio and any major fraction thereof. No such county
was combined with another county unless such combination made the
population per senator in such counties closer to the statewide average.1
While some of the disparity between the population of various districts
may have been due to gerrymandering, much of it was due to the district-
ing rules prescribed by the constitution itself. Since the constitution made
single-member districts mandatory, the legislature could not equalize
representation by apportioning to each district a number of senators
commensurate with that district's population. The best that the legisla-
ture could do was to try to establish districts that were as nearly equal
in population as possible. Yet, the legislature was compelled by a rule
which proscribed the splitting of a county unless such county were
"equitably entitled to two or more senators" to create districts which
were unequal in population.' 2 '
a Tabulated from statistics in 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 181-92
(1906).
b Made by constitutional convention.
c In 1892, Erie had a representative population of 304,713 and was given two seats, mak-
ing a representative population of 152,357 per seat.
d The difference between the largest and the smallest districts.
0 The State's total representative population divided by 32 (the total number of seats).
f The variation divided by the ratio.
120. The following table includes all counties having one or more senate ratios at the
time of any of the five apportionments.
1846 1857 1866 1879 1892
Albany: Number of Ratios 1.13a 1.06 0.98 1.01 0.87
Seats Apportioned 1 1 1 1 1
Erie: Number of Ratios 0.92 1.08 1.27 1.32 1.68
Seats Apportioned 1 1 1 1 2
Kings: Number of Ratios 0.82 1.68 2.39 3.40 5.06b
Seats Apportioned 1 2 2 3 5
Monroe: Number of Ratios 0.85 0.84 0.87 1.100 1.00+
Seats Apportioned 1 1 I 1 1
New York: Number of Ratios 3.94 4.42 5.33 6.89b 8.66d
Seats Apportioned 4 4 5 7 9
Oneida: Number of Ratios 1.05 1.01 0.91 0.79 1.090




d Included Westchester and Putnam.
e Included Lewis and Otsego.
3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 182-90 (1906).
121. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1846); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
1354-55 (2d ed. 1878).
APPORTIONMENT
Analysis of the first three constitutions shows that they contained
little in the way of direction to be followed in reapportioning senators.
The first constitution simply directed the legislature to proportion the
senators to the number of electors in each district. Whatever problems
arose in connection with senatorial representation under the second and
third constitutions were largely redistricting rather than reapportionment
problems. For the second constitution deprived the legislature of all
power to reapportion senators among the districts while the third limited
this power to apportioning senators to those counties that received two
or more senators. The constitution of 1846 provided no rule to be fol-
lowed in apportioning these senators to the multi-member counties except
the directive implied in the districting provision that "each senate district
shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, ex-
cluding aliens, and persons of color not taxed .... M22
II. Thm 1894 APPORTIONMENT FORmULA
In contrast to the simplicity of the first three constitutions, the con-
stitution of 1894 added five new elements which govern senatorial appor-
tionment today:
(1) The method for obtaining the ratio was prescribed.
(2) The method for enlarging the senate was also prescribed.
(3) It established the rule that no county may have four or more
senators unless it has a full ratio for each senator.
(4) It established the rule that no county may have more than one-
third of all senators.
(5) It established the rule that no two adjoining counties may have
more than one-half of all senators.123
The first step in apportioning the senate is to find the ratio, which the
constitution stipulates "shall always be obtained by dividing the number
of inhabitants, excluding aliens, by fifty... ."21' The census of 1950,
for example, showed a total citizen population of 14,203,449. This num-
ber divided by fifty gave a ratio of 284,069. The next step is to apportion
one senator for each full ratio to each county having a citizen population
equal to or in excess of three full ratios, i.e., to each county having at
least six per cent of the state's citizen population. When this was done
in 1953, twenty-seven senators were apportioned to five counties having
a total citizen population of 8,131,810.2 The final step is to subtract
122. Ibid.
123. N.Y. Const. art. M, § 4 (194); 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1894 of the State of New York 743 (1900).
124. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894).
125. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, pp. 7-S (1953). Kings (9); New York (6); Queens (5);
Bronx (4); and Erie (3).
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the number allotted to the most populous counties from the whole
number of senators to find the number of senators to be given to the
remaining counties. In apportioning senators to the populous counties,
however, the legislature must follow three mandatory rules that permit
no legislative discretion.'26
The First Rule
The first of these rules is that "no county shall have four or more
senators unless it shall have a full ratio for each senator."'27 This pro-
vision is derived from the proposal introduced in the convention of 1894
by Elon R. Brown of Jefferson County: "An additional senator shall not
be apportioned to any county on less than one-half the ratio; and, if
any county be entitled to three senators, an additional senator shall not
be apportioned to such county on less than the full ratio."'"" The Com-
mittee on Legislative Organization and Apportionment changed this
clause to read:
An additional senator shall not be apportioned to any county on less than one-half
the ratio, nor shall an additional senator be apportioned to any county on less than
the full ratio when the average number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, in the
districts in such county would not otherwise be one-tenth more than the ratio.12 0
In its report, the committee dismissed the first part of this clause
simply by saying: "The... provision that an additional senator shall not
be apportioned on less than one-half the ratio is so manifestly proper
that it demands no explanation." 30 The committee's report devoted more
attention, however, to the second half of the clause and used an example
126. The New York Court of Appeals also laid down four mandatory and three directive
rules for districting, which are beyond the scope of this article. If a mandatory rule con-
flicts with one that involves discretion, the discretionary rule must yield to the mandatory
one. If two mandatory or two discretionary rules conflict, the choice of the rule to be
followed rests with the Legislature. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 205, 81 N.E. 124, 130
(1907). See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, pp. 8-9 (1953); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 13-14
(1942).
127. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894). (Emphasis added.)
128. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 216 (1906). Under the con-
stitution of 1846, it had been the practice not to apportion an additional senator on less than
one half of a ratio. An overture introduced by Edward Lauterbach, which was "pigeon-
holed" in the committee, contained a similar limitation on the senatorial representation of
the most populous counties. It provided for apportioning one senator for a half ratio, two
senators for one and three-fourths ratios, three senators for three full ratios, and an additional
senator for each additional full ratio. Id. at 207.
129. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 56-57 (1900).
130. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York, Doc. No. 65, at 709 (1900).
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to explain it: If seven senators were apportioned to Kings, there would
have been a remainder of 58,264 citizens or just slightly more than one-
half the ratio.'3 ' This would mean that the average citizen population
per senator in that county would have been 124,140 or only 8,323 over
the ratio. If an eighth senator were apportioned to Kings, however, the
average citizen population per senator in that county would have been
only 108,623 or 7,194 below the ratio. 32 In the committee's opinion, it
was neither wise nor just to allow the average representative population
to fall uniformly below the ratio when so many senators are apportioned
to a single county. The committee argued that the inequality caused
by preserving county lines would operate harshly against the less
populous counties if the more populous counties were permitted to have
senators on less than the ratio. 33  9
Stephen S. Blake of New York City objected to the so-called one-tenth
rule and pointed out that it would prevent New York and Brooklyn from
receiving an additional senator unless the fractional remainder equals
one-tenth of the ratio for each district in the county.134 To put it another
way, the remainder required for the apportionment of an additional
senator to a county would equal one-tenth of a ratio multiplied by the
number of full ratios that county had. Since New York had twelve full
ratios and since one-tenth of a ratio was 11,582 in 1894, New York
could not have received an additional senator on a remainder of less than
138,984. This meant that New York could not have received a senator
on less than the full ratio which was 115,817. At the same time, the
one-tenth rule would have allowed Albany, Oneida, Monroe, Onondaga,
and other such counties to have received an additional senator on a
remainder of only 11,582 if the one-half rule had not raised the minimum
to 57,909. 1-3 Blake alleged that this was "cunningly contrived" in order
to "prevent New York and Kings from ever ... obtaining a fraction of
the rights of which they have been.., robbed .... 11,G
131. Ibid. The state's total citizen population according to the cereus of 1892 v.-as
5,790,865. This number divided by 50 yields a ratio of 115,17. Dividing the citizcn popula-
tion of Kings (6S,983) by the ratio (115,817) gives a quotient of 7 with a remainder of
53,264. This remainder represents only 6.7% of King's total citizen population.
132. King's citizen population of M5S,983 divided by 7 equals 124,140; 124,140 lM 115,S17
equals 3,323. And S68,983 divided by 8 equals 103,623; 10S,623 less 115,317 equals -7,194.
133. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York, Doc. No. 65, at 7cS-10 (1900).
134. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 1173 (1900). (Emphasis added.)
135. Author's computations on the basis of the 1392 census as in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 59,
pp. 32-33 (1942).
136. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1394 of the State of New
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In answer to Blake and other objectors, Elihu Root argued that the
system really would discriminate against the less densely populated
areas. Grouping districts within a single county gives that county an
enormous advantage, he argued, because these districts can combine
their remainders to gain an additional senator. The remainders in the
rural districts, however, can not be added together, because these re-
mainders are not all in the same county. An upstate surplus would be
of no avail, Root pointed out, unless it equalled at least a half ratio.
Therefore, he argued, twelve rural districts might have surpluses totaling
more than five ratios without gaining a thirteenth senator. 37 Root con-
tended that the question of remainders is not merely a question of the
absolute size of the remainder but a question of how large a proportion
of the district's poptlation that remainder represents. He pointed out
that New York County's remainder of 34,000 was only two per cent
(actually 2.4 per cent) of the county's population while Oneida's re-
mainder of 8,000 (actually 1,208) and Onondaga's remainder of 27,000
(actually 26,241) represented approximately fifteen per cent (actually
10.6 per cent) of their population. Therefore, he argued, New York
County has only two per cent of its population unrepresented while
Oneida and Onondaga have fifteen per cent (actually 1.03 per cent and
18.5 per cent, respectively) of their population unrepresented. In Root's
opinion, the only fair rule for apportioning senators on remainders would
be to give the extra senators to the districts whose surpluses constitute
the largest percentage of the population of the district.1 8
York 1178 (1900). Also, arguing on the basis of the 1892 census, Michael J. Mulqueen,
another delegate from New York City, pointed out that New York County could have a
remainder of 114,000 [actually 115,816] and Brooklyn a remainder of 114,000 [actually
81,073] without receiving an additional senator. But four rural counties can each have a
remainder of 57,000] [actually 57,909] or 230,000 [actually 231,636] in all and be entitled
to four additional senators. "Gentlemen .. .just think of the fraud on the cities you are
asked to commit -230,000 [actually 231,636] inhabitants residing in the rural districts
will have four more senators, but New York and Kings may increase 228,000 [actually
196,889] in population and have no additional Senators. And this is what you have called
justice to cities." 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State
of New York 23 (1900). Bracketed numbers are the correct ones supplied by the author.
137. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1226-228 (1900). Similarly see 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of
1894 of the State of New York 1251, 1254-255 (1900), where the convention, in its address
to the people followed a similar line of reasoning.
138. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1229 (1900). The numbers in parenthesis are the correct ones supplied by the author.
Root's rule can be illustrated by the following example: Assume that the ratio is 100,000.
If county A has a population of 1,030,000, its remainder of 30,000 would represent 2.9%
of that county's population. If county B has a population of 104,000, its remainder of 4,000
would represent 3.8% of B's population. Therefore, an additional senator would be ap-
portioned to B in preference to A although A's remainder is 7 2 times as large as B's.
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Apparently to meet the objections of Elihu Root, John I. Gilbert,','
and others who thought that the large cities would have undue represen-
tation in the legislature, Tracey C. Becker, delegate from Erie and
chairman of the Committee on Legislative Organization, proposed to
substitute the following for the clause previously reported by the com-
mittee: "Every county having four or more senators shall have a full
ratio for each senator.... ,'4 1 This motion was carried,141 and the Brown
plan with the Becker amendment was adopted by a vote of eighty-four
to fifty-four" and sent to the Committee on Revision. The clause was
reported by the Committee on Revision and passed on the third reading
by a vote of ninety-six to sixty in the form found in the constitution
today: "No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall have
a full ratio for each senator."'143
It will be noted that the Becker amendment made two changes: First,
the provision requiring at least one-half ratio for the apportionment of
an additional senator was deleted. This change was, of course, in line
with Root's argument in behalf of the less densely populated districts.
As a matter of history, this change has meant the apportionment of
four senators on a remainder of less than a half ratio.' Second, the
four-or-more rule was substituted for the one-tenth rule. While the one-
tenth rule would only have prevented the possibility of senators' being
apportioned on fractions to counties having more than ten ratios, the
rule adopted prevented the apportionment of such senators to all counties
having more than three ratios. In 1894, the Becker rule limited the
senatorial representation only of New York and Kings. The census of
1905 added Erie to the list. The census of 1915 added Bronx while the
census of 1925 added Queens. Thus, the rule now operates against five
139. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 1074-75 (1900).
140. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 61 (1900).
141. Id. at 62-63.
142. Id. at 96.
143. N.Y. Coast. art. II, § 4 (1894).
144. In its Address to the People, the convention said that the ".maller counties may
receive a Senator, or an additional senator, on a major fraction of a ratio." 4 Revised Record
of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York 1254 (1900). In
1943, however, Westchester was apportioned three seats on 2.2 ratios. In 1953, Nascau was
apportioned three seats on 2.3 ratios, Westchester three seats on 2.1 ratios, and Onondaga
two seats on 1.2 ratios. Although the court of appeals confused the question, it approved
the 1943 apportionment of three senators to Westchester on 2.2 ratios and two to
Nassau on 1.5 ratios. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 218, 52 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1943). Thee counties
did, however, have a full "second ratio" or major fraction thereof for each seat appor-
tioned. See note 256 infra.
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counties. 145 Since the census of 1960 is certain to add Nassau to the
list, it has been suggested that the rule be changed from "four or more"
so that it would read: "No county shall have more than four senators
unless it shall have a full ratio for each senator .. . .140 This proposed
change is designed to permit the apportionment of a fourth senator to
a county on less than a full ratio and, thereby, "to give more adequate
representation to the essentially urban counties outside of New York
City.",14
7
The Second and Third Rules
The second mandatory rule is that "no county shall have more than
one-third of all the senators . *. . ."I" The third rule provides that "no
two counties or the territory thereof as now [in 1894] organized, which
are adjoining counties, or which are separated only by public waters,
shall have more than one-half of all the senators."'49 These two limita-
145.
SENATE-SEAT R AINDERs n Ar COUNTIES HAVING THREE OR MORE FuLu RATIOS
1892 1905 1915 1925
NEW YoRx CITY 92,444 153,874 182,839 373,618
Bronx - - 9,564 146,914
Kings 58,264 48,702 151,701 58,148
New York 34,180 105,172 21,574 103,599
Queens - - - 64,957
REmAINDER OF STATE - 14,797 23,413 57,265
Erie - 14,797 23,413 57,265
Nassau - - -
CONSTrUTIONAL APPORTION-
MdENT RATIO 115,817 141,260 161,190 193,356
1930 1940 1950 1960
NEw YORK CITY 558,945 515,837 435,652 707,547
Bronx 177,803 1,134 241,905 68,943
Kings 161,306 175,241 38,566 244,798
New York 142,421 127,818 91,312 284,805
Queens 77,415 211,644 63,869 109,001
REMAiNDER OF STATE 40,988 20,992 26,295 366,553
Erie 40,988 20,992 26,295 65,200
Nassau - - - 301,353
CoNsTiToNAL APPORTION-
mENT RATIO 221,811 248,027 284,069 324,816
146. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, p. 73 (1950).
147. Id. at 56. F. Morse Hubbard, Research Counsel to the Joint Legislative Committee
on Reapportionment, mentions Erie, Monroe, and Westchester as possible beneficiaries of
his proposal. Ibid.
148. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894). (Emphasis added.)
149. Ibid.
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tions on New York City's representation are derived from the Becker
amendment, which originally provided:
[N]o city or county shall have more than one-third of all the senators, unless the
counties of New York and Kings, or the cities of New York and Brooklyn, are
consolidated, in which case the city or county so formed shall have no more than
one-half of all the senators.50o
After this proposal was adopted,'"" Andrew H. Green, a delegate from
New York City, pointed out that there was to be a vote on the consolida-
tion of New York, Brooklyn, part of Westchester, all of Richmond,
and part of Queens. He argued that the Becker amendment would be an
impediment to consolidation, because, he said, these counties would have
one-sixth less senatorial representation if they consolidated than they
would have if they did not.1"2 Since New York and Kings were appor-
tioned only nineteen senators and the area now contained in the five
New York City counties were together apportioned only forty-three per
cent of the fifty senators in 1894, it is difficult to see how the Becker rule
would have reduced their representation. In any case, Charles Z. Lincoln,
delegate from Cattaraugus County and a member of the Committee on
Legislative Organization, proposed a change which, he said, was de-
signed to avoid embarrassing New York and Brooklyn and which ex-
pressed the ideas of Andrew H. Green, Elihu Root, John I. Gilbert,
and various other delegates concerning the large cities' ultimate share
in senatorial representation:
No county shall have more than one-third of all the senators, and no tw~o counties
of the territory thereof as now organized, which are adjoining counties or vhich
are separated only by public waters, shall have more than half of all the senate.253
There has never been occasion to apply the two rules contained in
the Lincoln amendment, because no county has ever been constitutionally
entitled to one-third of the senators, and no two adjoining counties have
ever been constitutionally entitled to one-half of the senators. It appears
that this provision would not prevent apportioning a majority of senators
to the sLx counties whose territory was largely encompassed by New
York, Kings, Queens, and Richmond counties in 1894. It would, of
course, prevent apportioning a majority of senators to the territory
included in any two of these four counties, with Bronx included as part
of New York and Nassau as a part of Queens.1z  Since this provision
150. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 57, 61 (1900).
151. Id. at 62-63.
152. Id. at 82-S3.
153. Id. at 357, 369, 372-73.
154. If there should ever be occasion to apply the latter provision, the phrasE "of the
territory thereof as now organized" would raise some difficult questions. In 1953, the Joint
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would not prevent the five counties of New York City (New York,
Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond) from having a majority of the
senate, the 1938 convention proposed that the provision be amended
to read: "Counties wholly within the boundaries of a city shall not have
together more than one-half of the total number of senators."''1
While the second and third mandatory rules have never been ap-
plicable, the four-or-more-senator rule has limited the senatorial repre-
sentation not only of New York, Kings, and Bronx counties but also
of Erie and Queens. In 1894, when Erie had only 2.6 ratios, Tracey C.
Becker apparently did not realize that his amendment would ever limit
his own county's senatorial representation. Certainly, no one seemed
to think that the provision might ever apply to Queens, 100 not to mention
Legislative Committee on Reapportionment said: "Present Bronx and New York Counties
comprise substantially the same territory as New York County in 1894. Present Queens
and Nassau Counties comprise substantially the same territory as Queens County in 1894."
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 8 (1953). The fact is that the present Bronx is composed of
territory, more than half of which was in Westchester county in 1894. Moreover, parts
of Queens were annexed to Kings in 1915 and 1925 while part of Kings was annexed to
Queens in 1925. Thus, present Kings, Queens, and Nassau comprise the same territory as
Kings and Queens in 1894.
155. Journal of the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, Doc. No. 16, p.
49 (1938); New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, Doc. No. 18, p. 8 (1938);
4 Revised Record of the 1938 New York State Constitutional Convention 2866 (1938). In
1950, the research counsel to the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment proposed
an amendment providing that counties wholly within the boundaries of a city shall not
together have more than one half of all senators and assemblymen. He argued that no
city, regardless of how many counties it contains, should determine the policies for the
rural areas which have neither political cohesion among themselves nor a voice in the
councils of that city. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 53-55, 73-74 (1950). In the convention of
1915, Mr. D. Nicoll summarized the history of attempts to limit New York City's legislative
representation. He noted that the 1821 convention committee on the legislature recom-
mended basing representation on population. Samuel Young of Saratoga moved to sub-
stitute electors for population. Ogden Edwards of New York City objected because electors
included not only taxpayers and those who served in the militia but also those who worked
on roads. Since many rural citizens, but virtually no city citizens worked on roads, Edwards
pointed out, the Young substitute would discriminate against New York City. After Edwards
made an eloquent defense of the city's role in the State, the convention adopted Jacob
Radcliffe's motion to base representation on population. Nicoll said that the conventions
of 1846 and 1867 made no attempt to limit New York City's representation. He then
outlined the 1894 convention's alleged discrimination against the city and objected to the
1915 convention's perpetuation of this discrimination. 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional
Convention of 1915 of the State of New York 646-58 (1916).
156. In the argument before the court of appeals in In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E.
124 (1907), Elon R. Brown, counsel for appellants, said that the limitations on the senatorial
representation of counties having more than three senators "have no application either in
word or principle to Queens and Richmond as parts of Greater New York." Id. at 193
(points of counsel).
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Nassau. All three rules were both attacked and frankly defended as
though they would apply only to New York and Brooklyn.
Gilbert argued that the Brown-Becker-Lincoln amendment did not
go far enough in limiting New York City's and Brooklyn's senatorial
representation.157 Elihu Root defended placing limitations on New York
City's representation by saying that all of the city's representatives
were responsible to the same political organization and represented the
entire city rather than their separate districts. Since representatives from
the city do not represent their locality, their artificial districts, but
rather the whole city, Root argued, they are a more effective power in
the legislature than an equal number of representatives from widely
separated counties. Therefore, Root contended, New York City's twelve
senators could not be compared with twelve other senators who represent
entirely different interests and who are responsible to entirely different
constituencies. If population were the only basis of representation, he
feared, New York and Brooklyn would soon dominate the entire State.0 3
Following a similar line of reasoning, the Report of the Committee on
Legislative Organization said:
Inasmuch as every senator from a county, in a broad sense, represents the entire
county, our proposed rule can never work any real injustice. The rule regarding
county lines makes inequality as between the rural counties of the State and the
city counties of the State inevitable to a certain degree, and, we think, that this
inequality should not be increased as against the rural counties, and in favor of the
counties of the State embracing the great cities vhich are incorporated entities,
unified in interest, and with a small area of population.la)
Stephen S. Blake, delegate from New York City, agreed that the
preservation of county lines caused inevitable inequalities. He saw
no reason, however, why the county rule should be supported by other
rules that increased these inequalities. Why, he asked, should not New
York, Kings, Erie, and Monroe have more senators than the other
counties if they have a larger population? Why shouldn't the other
counties have less senators if they have a smaller population? He
contended that the committee had devised a rule to cheat the cities of
their fair and just representation and had tried to cloak this injustice
with "the sophistical and dishonest plea that each senator from one of
these counties represents in a broad sense-in a broad sense, mark you
the word, sir-in a broad sense the county, and, therefore, the rule
157. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 374 (1900).
158. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 1223-26 (1900).




works no injustice."'60 The logical conclusion to this line of reasoning,
Blake argued, was that New York County should have only one senator
who could represent the whole county "in a broad sense."
Delegate Mulqueen protested that, although New York and Brooklyn
then paid two-thirds of the state's taxes and might some day have eighty
per cent of the population and pay three-fourths of the taxes, they must
always be ruled by a legislature elected outside these cities.1 1 John M.
Bowers 6' and DeLancey Nicoll, 16 3 also delegates from New York City,
and others likewise protested against these rules. Benjamin S. Dean, a
member of the majority representing Allegany, Cattaraugus, and Chau-
tauqua Counties, also protested and proposed a substitute, which pro-
vided that each senate district should be composed of "a contiguous
territory [and] shall approximate, with the greatest possible degree of
accuracy, the ratio.. ."I" established by dividing the State's citizen pop-
ulation by the total number of senators. Dean's proposal specifically pro-
vided that this principle should apply not only to the multi-county
districts but also to the districts in a single county entitled to more than
one senator.
65
After defeating the Dean plan by a vote of ninety-four to fifty-three,106
the convention adopted the Brown-Becker-Lincoln plan. In its "address
to the people," the convention frankly met the attack on this provision:
Before another Constitutional Convention presents its work to the people, it is
probable that the cities of New York and Brooklyn, or the greater city formed by
their union, will contain a majority of the inhabitants of the State. If the present
system continues, they will be able to elect the Governor, the State officers, a
majority of the senate and a majority of the assembly. Both by the force of
numbers and by the multiplied power of compact organization and cohesion among
the representatives from a single county, responsible to a single local political
organization, they will be able absolutely to control the government of the State.
What will be the consequence of compelling the vast region extending from the city of
New York to the St. Lawrence and to Lake Erie, with its varied interests, sentiments
and opinions, not over well understood by the inhabitants of the city, to submit to
such a domination? Would such an arrangement conduce to the permanent welfare
of the State? Our opinion is that it would not; and that the provision which secures
to the whole State outside of the city a bare half of one house of the legislature,
leaving to the city such control as its members [numbers?] may give over the other
160. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1174-75 (1900).
161. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 20-26 (1900).
162. Id. at 662-64.
163. Id. at 650-52.
164. Id. at 646.
165. Ibid.
166. Id. at 667-68.
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house and over the executive department, is a slender enough safeguard against so
unfortunate a result.
We believe the provision to be sound in principle, that somewhere in every re-
presentative government there should be a recognition of variety of interest and extent
of territory as well as of mere numbers united in interest and location. 107
The convention told the people that, even with these limitations, "the
advantage is still greatly on the side of the city as against the country
districts on account of their small territory, and the fact that all
their representatives stand for the entire city."' The apportionment
article, which was submitted separately, was approved by a popular
vote of 404,335 to 350,625.109 Thus, were adopted the three mandatory
rules limiting the senatorial representation of counties having more than
three ratios. While numerous proposals for abolishing these rules have
been introduced, the legislature has never passed such a measure and,
consequently, none has ever been submitted to popular vote.'" The
convention of 1915 proposed no significant change in these rules,' but
the convention of 1938 recommended that they be altered to further
limit New York City's senatorial representation.172 Since the apportion-
ment proposals of both conventions were rejected at the polls,'-- the
three mandatory rules stand unaltered.
167. Id. at 1255.
168. Ibid.
169. This may be compared with the vote of 410,697 for and 327,402 agaimt the revised
constitution. N.Y. Leg. Manual 169 (1925). The vote of 754,960 on the apportionment
amendment may be compared with the 1894 gubernatorial vote of 1,257,671, the 1892
presidential vote of 1,336,772, and the 1896 presidential vote of 1,423,876. Burnham, Presi-
dential Ballots 1836-1892, at 633 (1955); Robinson, The Presidential Vote 1896-1932, at
275 (1947). According to the federal census of 1890, the State's male citizen population over
21 was 1,504,4S2. Abstract of the Eleventh Census of 1890, at 63, S3 (2d ed. 1S96).
170. For the texts of such proposals introduced from 1895 to 1937, see 2 New, York State
Constitutional Convention Committee of 1938, Amendments Proposed to New York Con-
stitution 1895-1937, at 132-36, 142, 151 (1938). Two of the proposals would have repealed
only the second and third rules but one of these would have added, "Each county having a
full ratio for each senator shall have the same proportion of all the senators as the amount
of the expenses of the state paid by such county bears to the total expenses of the state.
Id. at 134, 136. Another would not only have repealed the three rules but would also have
added, "No county nor group of counties shall have more senators than another county
or group of counties having a greater number of inhabitants, excluding aliens not taxed."
Id. at 135. Proposals introduced in the legislature since 1937 have been of thece same
general types.
171. The only alteration proposed was that the phrase "as now organized" in the third
rule be changed to "as organized on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred
and ninety-five." 4 Revised Record of the 1915 New York State Constitutional Convention
of 1915 of the State of New York 4244 (1916).
172. See note 155 supra.
173. The vote in 1915 was 371,588 for the proposal and 891,337 against it; the 1938
vote was 84S,367 to 1,425,344. N.Y. Leg. Manual 2SS, 295 (1958).
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III. SIZE OF THE SENATE
After apportioning senators to the counties having more than three
ratios, the next step is to determine the total number of senators. The
present constitution says: "The senate shall consist of fifty members,
except as hereinafter provided .... '1 4 The constitution of 1777 had set the
size of the senate at twenty-four but provided for an increase up to one
hundred as the state's electors increased. In 1796, the senate was en-
larged to forty-three members, but the convention of 1801 reduced
the number to thirty-two. Although the conventions of 1821 and 1846
held the senate at thirty-two members, there was considerable sentiment
in the 1846 convention to enlarge the senate allegedly to provide more
adequate representation and to allow a more equitable apportionment. 176
In 1846, New York, Kings, Monroe, and Erie had been apportioned
only seven of the thirty-two senators. By 1892, however, the representa-
tive population of these four counties had grown to the point where they
had been apportioned half of the entire senate.16 As senators were drawn
from the rural areas to the large cities, the territorial extent of the
rural districts was increased. The largest district in 1847 was the com-
bination of Franklin and St. Lawrence Counties with 4,457 square miles
while the largest district in 1892 consisted of seven counties with 8,516
square miles. Consequently, there was strong sentiment in the 1894 con-
vention to increase the number of senators in order to be able to appor-
tion more senators to the rural areas and thereby reduce the territorial
extent of the rural districts. 7
The Committee on Legislative Organization reported the Brown plan,
which called for a senate of fifty members. The committee defended
this increase on the ground that the size of the senate had been set
in 1821, when the State's population was little more than one-fifth of
the population in 1892. The committee argued that the rural districts
had grown so large geographically that rural senators had lost their
sense of locality. The committee pointed out that the eight multi-member
districts had been replaced by thirty-two single member districts in
1846 to give senators a closer tie to their constituents. The committee
contended that a senate of fifty would restore to the rural areas approxi-
174. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 2 (1894).
175. 2 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 127-28 (1905).
176. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 92-93, 100-101 (1950).
177. Overtures introduced by Commodore P. Vedder and William J. Mantayno
provided for enlarging the senate above thirty-two. John Bigelow's proposal provided for
a senate of thirty-five. Henry J. Cookingham's, John C. Davies' and Elon R. Brown's all
provided for a senate of fifty. James S. Porter's called for sixty, Edward Lauterbach's
for seventy, and Mirabeau L. Town's for 160 senators. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History
of New York 207-11 (1906).
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mately the same number of senators they had had in 1846, with the
eighteen additional senators going to the great centers of population.'--
Tracey C. Becker, Nathan A. Woodward, Henry J. Cookinham, and
others defended the increase on much the same grounds used by the
committee.'"2 Elihu Root argued that the area of a rural senate district
had become so large that a senator could not properly represent all of
the people in his district. Root contended that a senate of fifty would
be small enough to permit it to be a deliberative body but would have
enough senators for the districts to be sufficiently small so that a senator
could really represent his constituents.1so Elon R. Brown pointed out
that this enlargement had permitted a reduction of the territorial extent
of the rural districts so that eleven of the upstate districts were identical
to eleven districts drawn in 1846.111 Charles S. Alereness, who identified
himself as a Republican farmer, noted with satisfaction that eleven of
the eighteen new senators were to be apportioned to the area above the
Harlem River. 82
George H. Bush, delegate from Ulster, objected to this increase and
said that one senator can intelligently represent a geographically large area
since railroads, the telegraph, and newspapers make it possible to hear
from every quarter of any district in a half hour. Bush proposed a
senate of fort, and said that a forty member senate would be evenly
divided between the two major parties, that a fifty member senate would
have a Republican majority while a sixty member senate would be con-
trolled by the Democrats. "And now you know," he said, "why they
take fifty in preference to any other divisor." '' 1 Although a Republican,
Benjamin S. Dean also opposed enlarging the legislature on the ground
that the increase appeared to be designed to give the Republican Party
a majority. 84 Jacob M. Maybee objected to enlarging the legislature
not only because it would increase the cost but also because it would
mean smaller districts.8 5 William Sullivan thought an increase in popula-
tion simply required an increase in the ratio rather than enlargement
of the legislature.' Not only did the convention reject three motions to
178. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
Y1ork 711 (1900). See also N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 90-91, 10-101 (1950).
179. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of IS94 of the State of New
York 99S-1002, 1166, 1237 (1900).
10. Id. at 1210-11.
131. Id. at 1029-31.
182. Id. at 1182.
183. Id. at 1007-03. He said the senate would be divided with twenty-eight or twenty-
nine Republicans to twenty-one or twenty-two Democrats.
184. Id. at 1155-60.
1SS. Id. at 1162-63.
186. Id. at 1103.
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keep the senate at thirty-two members, but it also adopted a motion
allowing the senate to be enlarged to more than fifty members. 87
In order to prevent the more populous counties from gaining sena-
torial representation at the expense of the less populous counties in
the future, delegates Becker' 88 and Lincoln8 9 submitted two proposals
which the Committee on Revision combined into the clause found in
the constitution today:
[T]he senate shall always be composed of fifty members, except that if any county
having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on
such ratio to an additional senator or senators, such additional senator or senators
shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number
of senators shall be increased to that extent.'90
Since this clause was not introduced until late in the debate, it was
not discussed at any length. In fact, George H. Bush, the minority
leader, was the only delegate who attempted to interpret it on the floor
of the convention. Bush pointed out that New York County was given
twelve senators by the proposed constitution. If New York were entitled
to fifteen after the next census, he continued, these three additional
senators would be apportioned to New York but would be given in
addition to the fifty so that the less populous districts would not be
changed. "In other words," he said, "this scheme contemplates simply
that the present apportionment may always remain.... ." He argued that
the senate could never be reapportioned "but you may add on until New
York may have sixteen senators...."I"
The first question raised by the constitutional provision for enlarging
the senate is whether "such additional senator or senators" are to be
determined by comparing the number of senators to which such county
is entitled under the new apportionment with the number it had under
the last apportionment or with the number given to it by the constitution
in 1894. When the first reapportionment act was passed in 1906, this
question was not presented since the last apportionment was the one
made by the convention of 1894. When the counties entitled to three
or more senators under the new apportionment were compared with the
number of senators such counties had under the previous apportionment,
187. Motions by William H. Cochran, Stephen S. Blake, and Benjamin S. Dean. 4
Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 44-48,
55-56, 645-46, 667-68 (1900).
188. Id. at 57, 61.
189. Id. at 369.
190. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894). (Emphasis added.)




only Kings showed an increase." ' Therefore, Kings was given the
eighth senator in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number
of senators was increased from fifty to fifty-one. As obiter dictum in In
re Sherrill, Judge Emory A. Chase approved of the enlarged senate:
"[A]nd the county of Kings was entitled to one senator more than the
number specifically provided therefor by the Constitution as adopted
in 1894, and under the new constitutional provision it increased the
full number of senators in the state from 50 to 51."103 After the act of
1906 was declared unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do
with the size of the senate,194 the legislature passed another reapportion-
ment act, which also provided for a senate of fifty-one members.",:
The census of 1915 clearly presented the question. Kings had eight
senators under the act of 1907 and was still entitled to eight under the
new apportionment. If the number of senators to which Kings was
entitled were compared to the number Kings had under the previous
apportionment, there was no increase, and the total number of senators
would revert to fifty. But, if Kings' eight senators were compared to
the seven given to Kings in 1894, the eighth senator was an "additional"
senator, and the senate would be composed of fifty-one members. The
Special Committee on Apportionment recommended a senate of fifty-
one. 9" The committee pointed out that the constitution required West-
chester and Queens each to be given two senators under the census of
1915 while they had each had only one under the apportionment of
1894. These two additional senators for Westchester and Queens had
192.
County 1894 1905 Gain
Kings 7 3 +1
New York 12 12 0
Erie 3 3 0
193. In re Sherrill, ISS N.Y. 135, 209, 31 N.E. 124, 132 (1907).
194. Ibid. The act of 1906 (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1906, ch. 431) was held unconstitutional on
three grounds: (1) The thirteenth senatorial district was not "in as compact form as prac-
ticable" as required by the constitution; (2) Richmond had been unconstitutionally joined
to Queens since Queens was entitled to a senator without Richmond; (3) The population
difference of 109,012 between the first district's 137,175 and the second district's 246,187
was held to violate the constitutional requirement that "each senate district Aall contain
as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants, excluding allens.... " N.Y. Const.
art. II, § 4 (1894).
195. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1907, ch. 727. This law was challenged in 1911, but the court of
appeals refused to pass on its constitutionality because of the objector's laches in waiting
until after four elections had been held under the act before challenging its validity. In re
Reynolds, 144 App. Div. 458, 129 N.Y. Supp. 629 (Ist Dept), aft'd, 202 N.Y. 430, 95 N.E.
37 (1911). This act became N.Y. ConsoL Laws of 1909 art. VIII, § 120. Theoretically,
all subsequent senatorial reapportionments are amendments to art. VI, § 120.
196. N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 46, p. 24 (1916).
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to be taken from the forty-eight rural counties, which had nineteen sena-
tors under the act of 1907. Therefore, the committee continued, these
forty-eight counties will have only seventeen and would have only six-
teen senators if the total number were reduced from fifty-one to fifty.
If the 1925 apportionment should increase the senators to fifty-seven,
the reduction from fifty-seven to fifty at the next apportionment would
leave these forty-eight counties with only nine senators. The committee
thought that such an interpretation of the clause would be contrary to
the intention of the constitutional convention. In the committee's opinion,
"the safeguard provided against such a contingency was permanent and
not [merely] for a ten year period."1197
In a minority report, Robert F. Wagner and Thomas H. Cullen con-
tended that the eighth senator in Kings had been an "additional" senator
in 1906 and 1907 but ceased to be so in 1916 since Kings gained no ad-
ditional senator over the number apportioned in 1906 and 1907. Wagner
and Cullen thought the language of the constitution is clear: "The senate
shall always be composed of fifty members . . . ."' They argued that,
after a census, there should be fifty senators "to be increased only when
some county with three or more senators is entitled at the time of the
apportionment to an additional senator or senators."" 9 Additional to
what? "In addition to the number of senators such county had under
the existing apportionment."2 ' Any other interpretation, they continued,
would ignore the important adverb "always." The two dissenters thought
their interpretation was further supported by the constitutional provision
which says that the ratio shall always be found by using fifty as the
divisor. If the majority's interpretation were correct, they argued, "the
divisor would have been the existing number of senators" rather thanfifty.201
The act of 1916 provided for a senate of fifty-one members.20 2 Al-
though the statute was declared unconstitutional on other grounds, Judge
Chase said in In re Dowlng2 °s that the new number of senators to which
197. Id. at 23-24. The hypothetical case was as follows:
1894 1907 1916 1925 1935
14 urban
counties 31 32 34 41 41
48 rural
counties 19 19 16 16 9







N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894).
N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, pp. 1-2 (1916).
Ibid.
Ibid.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 373.
219 N.Y. 44, 51-56, 113 N.E. 545, 546-47 (1916).
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Kings was entitled should be compared with the number of senators
given to Kings by the constitution of 1394 and not with the number
Kings had just before the reapportionment in 1916. After saying that
this question had not been involved in the Shcrrill case ten years earlier,
he reviewed the records of the convention to show that the provision
was intended to allow increased senatorial representation for the most
populous counties without taking it from the rural areas. Judge Chase
concluded that this purpose could not be realized unless the comparison
be made with the apportionment of 1894. Whether the number appor-
tioned in 1916 should be compared with the number apportioned in 1907
or with the number apportioned in 1894 was a question, clearly presented,
fully argued in the briefs, and discussed at length in Judge Chase's opin-
ion. Since the court disposed of the case on other grounds, however, it
has been contended that Judge Chase's views on the size of the senate
are mere dicta.2 0 4
Whether Judge Chase's views were dicta or ruling, the act of 1917
conformed to them by providing for a senate of fifty-one members' 2
And, since no reapportionment was enacted until after the census of
1940, this statute stood until 1943.200 Following the census of 1935,
William J. O'Shea, counsel to the Joint Legislative Committee on Re-
apportionment, argued that Judge Chase's statement in the Dowling
case was mere dictum and that the number of senators to be apportioned
to the most populous counties should be compared with the number
they then had-which meant the number they had been given by the
act of 1917.0r Accordingly, O'Shea recommended a senate of fifty-
204. Four issues were presented: (1) Had the legiature violated the constitution by
making one district in New York County unduly larger than an adjoining district in the
same county? (2) Should the senate be composed of 50 or 51 members? (3) Did any of
the districts violate the rule of compactness? (4) Was the Brown formula propar for
assembly apportionment? Although Judge Chase expressed his views on all four i"sue, seven
judges unanimously held the statute to be unconstitutional solely on the basis of the first
question. The headnote in the New York Reporter says, however, that a senate of 51 was
"held" to be constitutional. 219 N.Y. 44 (1916).
205. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 798.
206. A reapportionment bill passed in 1926 was vetoed by Governor Alfred E. Smith.
Two bills passed in 1929 and 1930 were vetoed by Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Another bill was introduced in 1935 but failed to pass in the Legislature. N.Y. Sen. Dec. No.
46, p. 27 (1916).
207.
County 1917 1935 Gain
Kings s 9 + 1
New York 9 6 -
Bronx 3 4 +1
Erie 3 3 -
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two. 08 While the assistant counsel, Jasper W. Cornaire, thought the new
number of senators should be compared with the number given in 1894,209
a senate of fifty-two would have resulted from either comparison.210
The same question arose after the census of 1940. William F.
Bleakley, the new counsel to the Joint Legislative Committee on Re-
apportionment, contended that the comparison was to be made with
the apportionment of 1894.211 Assistant counsel O'Shea, on the other
hand, again argued that the comparison should be made with the then
existing apportionment of 1917.212
If the size of the senate had been set merely on the basis of this
issue, Bleakley's interpretation would have led to a senate of fifty-two
while O'Shea's would have meant a senate of fifty-three.1 In In re
Fay,2 14 Judge Pierce H. Russell held that O'Shea's method of comparison
was the proper one. This supreme court ruling was reversed, however,
by the court of appeals, which cited the Dowling case as authority and
held that the apportionment of 1894 was the only constitutional basis
for comparison.215
Whether one agrees with the ruling of the court of appeals on this
208. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, pp. 13-14 (1935).
209. Cornaire actually recommended a senate of 56 but did so on other grounds. N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 89, pp. 9-17 (1935).
210.
County 1894 1935 Gain




211. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 8-12 (1942):
County 1894 1942 Gain




212. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 59, pp. 7-25 (1942):
County 1917 1942 Gain
Kings 8 9 +1
New York 9 6
Bronx 3 5 +2
Erie 3 3
213. The act of 1943, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, chs. 359, 725, 733, provided for a senate of
56 but did so on other grounds.
214. 179 Misc. 1062, 1069, 43 N.Y.S.2d 787, 792 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
215. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 213, 52 N.E.2d 97, 101-02 (1943).
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point or not, the question apparently has been settled. In 1953, the
Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment simply cited the Dow-
ling and Fay cases and then proceeded to determine the size of the
senate by comparing the number of senators to be apportioned to the
most populous counties with the number allotted to them in 1894. 21 The
act of 1953 was based on this interpretation of the constitutional
clause.217
Even if the answer to this question is settled, the constitutional provi-
sion for enlarging the senate presents a second question. The constitu-
tion states: "[I] f any county having three or more senators at the time
of any apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional
senator or senators, such additional senator or senators shall be given to
such county in addition to the fifty senators .... "2 1 5 Does "any county
having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment" mean:
(1) a county having three or more senators under the apportionment
of 1894? (2) one having three or more just before the new apportion-
ment? (3) one entitled to three or more under the new apportionment?
(4) one having three or more under any valid apportionment since
1894?
Since delegate Bush used New York County to illustrate his point,
his explanation of the clause in the 1894 convention throws no light on
this question, because New York had twelve senators and was not likely
to be entitled to less than three according to any census in the fore-
seeable future. In this regard Charles Z. Lincoln, co-author of the
clause, commented:
The last sentence, authorizing an increase in the number of senators above fifty, is
at present applicable only to the counties of New York, Kings, and Erie. If the
senate ratio for the whole state under the enumeration of 1905, or any subsequent
enumeration, should show that a county in this class is entitled to an additional sen-
ator, the number of senate districts in that county will be increased accordingly, and
the whole number of senators will be correspondingly increased.210
Does the phrase "in this class" refer only to New York, Kings, and
Erie? Or, does the phrase "at present" imply that subsequent enumera-
tions may add other counties to "this class"?
The enumerations of 1905 and 1915 did not raise this question since
the only county entitled to an additional senator was Kings, which had
had more than three senators ever since the constitution was adopted in
1894. Although this issue was really not involved, in his brief attacking
216. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 9S, pp. 7-S (1953).
217. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 893. In 1954, ch. 2 clarified and corrected the
description of the 12th, 13th, and 16th districts while ch. 321 did the Fame for the
5th and 6th districts. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, chs. 2, 321.
213. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1S94).
219. 4 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 345 (1905).
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the act of 1906, Elon R. Brown seemed to say that the only counties
covered by the clause were those three which had more than two
senators under the apportionment of 1894: "The purpose of these
provisions was .. to prevent future apportionments from taking repre-
sentatives from the smaller counties to fill up the senatorial quota of
New York, Kings and Erie, with their enormous growth." 220 He then
added that it would be "whimsical in the extreme" to claim that this
clause had any "application whatever" to Queens and Richmond.22'
Did Brown mean that this clause never could apply to Queens and
Richmond because they did not have at least three senators under the
apportionment of 1894? Or, did he merely mean that the clause did not
then apply to Queens and Richmond because they did not have more
than two senators either before or after the apportionment of 1906?
Ten years later in his brief defending the act of 1916, Brown seemed
to say that the clause applied only to a county which had three or more
senators before the new apportionment and which was entitled to an
additional senator under the new apportionment:
It therefore becomes perfectly clear that the language of the exception, providing
for an additional senator or senators, must and does have reference to a situation
where a county having three or more senators has a full ratio of population entitling
it to an additional senator in excess of the number of senators to which it was
entitled under some preceding apportionment ...
Under the present apportionment it so happens that no county, having three or
more senators, has so increased in population as to entitle it to an additional senator
over and above the number fixed by the apportionment of 1907, but the County of
Kings is still entitled to eight senators or one additional senator in excess of what
it had under the constitutional apportionment of 1894. In other words, every county,
having three or more senators, stands precisely in the same situation as respects its
right of senatorial representation as it did in 1907.222
Although Bronx became entitled to three senators under the act of
1916, the above quotation would imply that Brown did not view Bronx
as a county "having three or more senators at the time of any apportion-
ment." It is true, of course, that Bronx had been a part of New York in
1907 and, therefore, perhaps was not a county entitled to an "additional"
senator. Later in his brief, Brown seemed to say that the clause in
question was limited to Kings and New York, which were the only
counties having three or more full ratios in 1894: "In providing for
'additional' senators in such counties the convention must have regarded
senators to be apportioned upon any future apportionment to Kings and
New York as 'additional' to those provided in the Constitution itself."2'
220. Brief for Appellant, p. 21, In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
221. Ibid.
222. Ibid.
223. Id. at 33.
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Was Brown simply saying that the senators to which Kings was entitled
in 1916 should be compared with the seven senators given to Kings in
1894 (a question before the court) or was he saying that the clause
applied only to Kings and New York (a question not before the court)?
At one point in his decision in the Dowling case, Judge Chase seemed to
say that the clause applied only to a county having at least three senators
immediately before the reapportionment. He said that the senate could
be enlarged above fifty "for one, and only for one purpose, and that is
to prevent counties having three or more senators from obtaining a larger
number of senators at the expense of the counties ... not having three or
more senators."' ' Later, however, he said:
When at the time of any apportionment the number of senators by the ratio ...
is determined all the counties then entitled to three or more senators are to have
the number of senators to which they are so entitled compared with the number of
senators given to such county by the Constitution of 1S94, and if by the ratio any
county is entitled to an additional senator or senators such additional senator or
senators must be given to such county, and the number of senators in the state must
be increased accordingly; 2
Whether all of Judge Chase's second statement was dictum or not may
be debatable. But the italicized part was certainly dictum since the only
county involved was Kings, which had more than three senators not
only under the act of 1916 but also under the apportionments of 1894
and 1907.
Regardless of Judge Chase's dictum, three later legislatures in-
terpreted the clause to apply only to counties having three or more
senators before the reapportionment rather than to counties entitled to
three or more senators under the new apportionment. The acts of 1926,
1929, and 1930 all provided for a senate of fifty-two, whereas Judge
Chase's interpretation would have called for a senate of fifty-four. -0
Although the governors vetoed the acts of 1926, 1929, and 1930,
224. In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 51, 113 N.E. 545, 551 (1916). (Emphasis added.)
225. Id. at 56, 113 N.E. at 549. (Emphasis added.)
226.
County 1894 1926, 1929, & 1930 Gain
New York &
Bronx 12 10 -
Kings 7 9 +2
Erie 3 3 -
Gain in all counties having three or
more senators. + 2
Queens 1 3 +2
Gain in all counties entitled to three
or more according to census of 1925. +4
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they did so not because of the number of senators but because the
districts allegedly were gerrymandered . 2 7  Before the first bill was
passed in 1926, Senator John Knight asked Attorney General Albert
Ottinger, "Is the number of senators to be increased from fifty-one to
fifty-two under the Census of 1925?" In his reply, Ottinger wrote:
By applying this ratio to the citizen population of the county of Kings... , it
appears that that county is entitled to nine senators, which is an addition of two over
the number apportioned to it by section 3 of article III of the constitution and,
this being a county now having three or more senators, the additional two senators
to which it is entitled are to be added to the fifty provided for by section 3, in-
creasing the number in the State to fifty-two.228
Although Ottinger pointed out that Queens County had become "entitled
to three senators," he did not suggest that this should enlarge the senate
above fifty-two members."0 Jasper W. Cornaire apparently accepted
Ottinger's opinion when he prepared the 1926 bill and introduced the
1930 bill since both provided for a senate of fifty-two members.
In 1935, however, Cornaire argued that the clause applied not only
to the counties actually having at least three senators in 1935 but also
to those counties entitled to three or more senators under the proposed
reapportionment. Therefore, as assistant counsel to the Joint Legislative
Committee on Reapportionment, Cornaire recommended a senate of
more than fifty-two members.23 °
In his defense of a larger senate, Cornaire argued that all of Judge
Chase's statement in the Dowling case 231 was a valid ruling of the court
227. Public Papers of Governor of New York State Alfred E. Smith 1926 (S. Intro.
No. 1538, Pr. No. 2012) 411-12 (1929); Public Papers of Governor of New York State
Franklin D. Roosevelt 1929 (S. Intro. No. 1491, Pr. No. 2004) 252-53 (1930) ; Public Papers
of Governor of New York State Franklin D. Roosevelt 1930 (Ass. Intro. No. 1552, Pr. No.
2329) 252-53 (1931).
228. 1926 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rep. 84-86 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
229. Id. at 85.
230. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 89, pp. 9-17 (1935).
County 1894 1935 Gain
Kings 7 9 +2
New York &
Bronx 12 10 -
Erie 3 3 -
Gain in all counties having three or
more senators in 1935. + 2
Queens 1 4 +3
Gain in all counties entitled to three
or more senators according to census
of 1930. +5
231. 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
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of appeals and, therefore, was binding on the legislature. The com-
mittee's counsel, William J. O'Shea, took a contrary view and argued that
all of the statement was mere dictum. Even if it be conceded that
Chase's views relative to comparing the new number of senators to the
number apportioned in 1894 were ruling, O'Shea continued, the remainder
of the statement was obiter dictum, because Kings was not a county
having less than three senators either before or after the apportionment
of 1916. Since O'Shea thought that the clause applied only to a county
having three or more senators before reapportionment, he recommended
a senate of fifty-two members. He pointed out that a larger senate would
mean that more senators would be apportioned to the less populous areas
and, therefore, would increase the population differential between the
more populous and the less populous districts.13
Although no reapportionment was passed in 1935, the whole issue
arose again after the census of 1940. As assistant counsel to the Joint
Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, O'Shea again recommended
fifty-two senators and took the same position he had taken in 1935." 4
The new counsel, William F. Bleakley, adopted Cornaire's position and
advised the apportionment of fifty-six senators.2 The 1943 bill provided
for a senate of fifty-six. Motions to reduce the number from fifty-sLx
to fifty-two were defeated in both houses, and the act passed in the
senate by a vote of forty-four to seven and in the assembly by a vote of
113 to thirty-three.se
During the first round of litigation in the Fay case, Judge Russell
held that a senate of fifty-sLx was unconstitutional because, among
other reasons, the provision for enlarging the senate applies only to
counties having at least three senators before the reapportionment. "37
A unanimous court of appeals, however, held the act to be constitutional
and ruled that the provision applied to all counties entitled to at least
three senators after the reapportionment. Five judges agreed that the
Dowling case was binding precedent and stated that the problems pre-
sented in the Dowling case were "substantially the same as those in the
present case.112" The fact is, of course, that the problems were not
"substantially the same," because Kings had at least three senators
232. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. S9, pp. 9-17 (1935).
233. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. S9, pp. 13-14 (1935).
234. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 59, pp. 7-25 (1942).
234. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 7-12 (1942).
236. Although there was a partisan division on the votes to reduce the number of
senators, the bill was passed by bipartisan majorities in both houses. N.Y. Times, March 22,
1943, p. 34, col. 2; N.Y. Times, March 17, 1943, p. 1, col. 4.
237. In re Fay, 179 lisc. 1062, 1070, 43 N.Y.S.2d 787, 792 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
23S. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 193, 213-15, 52 N.E.2d 97, 101-03 (1943).
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both before and after the apportionment of 1916 whereas Queens did not
have three senators before the apportionment of 1943.
In a concurring opinion, two judges argued that Judge Chase's state-
ment in the Dowling case was dictum but that the dictum had become
a part of the constitution because "the Constitutional Convention of
1938 had seriously before it the question of revision of the constitutional
provision of 1894 relating to reapportionment, as well as its construc-
tion in this court through the dictum in the Dowling case and made no
change and the People ratified the act of the Convention." 8 0 It is a fact,
however, that the 1938 convention did propose changes in the constitu-
tional provisions relating to reapportionment, and the people rejected
these proposals at the polls. Moreover, the 1938 proposals deleted the
provision for enlarging the senate so that this case could not possibly
have arisen if the voters had ratified these proposals.240
If the number of senators to be apportioned to the most populous
counties must be compared with the number allotted to them in 1894,
another problem arises: Bronx and Nassau did not exist in 1894. The
constitutional phrase "the territory thereof as now organized" relates
to the rule limiting the number of senators which two adjoining counties
may have. Moreover, this phrase is found in the second paragraph of
section 4 whereas the provision for enlarging the senate is at the end
of the third paragraph. Consequently, Judge Russell had a reasonable
basis for ruling that the phrase does not apply to the clause dealing with
enlargement of the senate and, therefore, that Queens and Nassau were
not to be lumped together for determining the number of "additional"
senators.2 4 This was no academic question, because Queens alone
showed an increase of only three senators while the two counties together
showed an increase of four. Moreover, Nassau alone was a county
neither having nor entitled to at least three senators. If Judge Russell's
ruling on this point were adopted, with what could Bronx's five senators
be compared? Both the legislature and the court of appeals solved the
problem by reading "the territory thereof as now organized" into the
third paragraph and, therefore, combining New York and Bronx on
the ground that they were "a single county in 1894 and had twelve
senators. 2 42 The actual fact is that Bronx is composed of forty-one
239. Judges Harlan W. Rippey and Albert Conway in an opinion written by the former.
Id. at 219, 52 N.E.2d at 104-05. (Italics added.)
240. The 1938 convention recommended an apportionment article that set the size of
the senate at 53. New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, Doc. No. 16, at 10,
49-52 (1938). For an excellent and thoughtful criticism of the Fay decision, see N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 31, pp. 37-43 (1950).
241. In re Fay, 179 Misc. 1062, 1067-068, 43 N.Y.S.2d 787, 791 (Sup. Ct. 1943).




square miles, twenty-one of which were in Westchester and twenty of
which were in New York in 1894.243
While the Fay decision may be criticized on grounds of both logic and
law, Warren Moscow may be correct in saying that the court of appeals
upheld the act of 1943 simply as a matter of public policy because it
was the first reapportionment in twenty-seven years.2 " Nevertheless,
the legislature has accepted the Fay decision as establishing the proper
procedure for enlarging the senate:
First, the State's total citizen population is divided by fifty to obtain
the ratio for apportioning senators to each county that has at
least six per cent of the State's citizen population.
Second, each such county is allotted one senator for each full ratio.
Third, the number of senators so allotted to each of these most popu-
lous counties is then compared with the number given to it in
the constitution of 1894. Where a county has been divided
since 1894, the number of senators allotted to the counties
comprising "substantially the same territory as was contained
in such original county is compared with the number of senators
given such county in the constitution of 1894... ."' The deci-
sion in the Fay case would seem to indicate that the legislature
has some discretion in deciding what constitutes "substantially
the same territory."
Fourth, any increase resulting from such comparison is then added to
fifty to give the whole number of senators.240
Thus, in 1953, the legislature decided that the senate should be com-
posed of fifty-eight members. 47
243. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 934; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1912, ch. 543; rE note 154 supra.
244. Politics in the Empire State 157-5S (1943).
245. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 7 (1953).
246. Ibid.
247. Id. at S.
County 1894 1953 Gain
Kings 7 9 +2
New Yorl- 2 6
Bronx 124-
Queens (1+
Nassaul 1 2 +
Erie 3 3 0
23 29 +8
Remainder
of state 27 29
Total senators 50 5S + S
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Since no reduction in the total number of senators results from a
populous county's loss, the effect is not to reduce the size of the senate
by the amount of the loss but to transfer these senators to the smaller
counties while continuing to enlarge the senate for the growing counties.
Although the senate has increased by eight, the largest counties have
gained only six. In short, New York County's loss of two senators was
not used to give additional senators to Kings, Queens, and Nassau. Rather,
these two senators were transferred to the less populous areas while
Kings, Queens, and Nassau have gained their additional senators by
enlarging the senate. This will be no academic point in 1963, when it
becomes apparent that New York County's loss of two senators will
mean two more senators for upstate. 4 s
IV. APPORTIONMENT TO COUNTIES HAVING LESS THAN THREE
RATIOS
The next step in apportioning senators is to subtract the number
allotted to the most populous counties from the whole number of
senators in order to find the number that are to be given to the remain-
ing counties. In 1953, for example, twenty-seven senators were ap-
portioned to the five counties that were each entitled to three or more
senators. Since the total number of senators was set at fifty-eight, there
were thirty-one senators to be distributed among the other fifty-seven
counties. 4" Although the constitution says that "the ratio for apportion-
ing senators shall always be obtained by dividing the number of inhabit-
ants, excluding aliens, by fifty,"'2 50 the actual procedure for apportioning
senators inevitably results in apportioning senators to the less populous
areas on a second and smaller ratio.
Since the more populous counties are required to have a full ratio for
248.




Queens 1 1+ 7
Nassaul t3
Erie 3 3
23 26 + 7
Remainder
of state 27 31
Total senators 50 57 + 7
249. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, pp. 9-10 (1953).
250. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894). (Emphasis added.)
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each senator, the average citizen population per senator in these
counties must always exceed the ratio. In 1953, for example, the ratio
was 284,069, but the average citizen population per senator in the five
largest counties was 301,178. Moreover, because senators are ap-
portioned to the large counties on the basis of a fifty-member senate
while the actual senate is larger, the de facto ratio for apportioning
senators to the other counties must necessarily be considerably smaller
than the constitutional ratio. -51 In 1953, for example there were fifty-eight
senators, thirty-one of whom were distributed to counties having a total
citizen population of only 6,071,639. This meant that the average citizen
251. SE-NATE KATios AND AvN'.Yurs
Citizen
Citizen Number of Population
Year Counties Population Senator3 Per Senator
1960 Six largest counties 9,519,316 26 366,128
All other counties 6,721,470 31 216,822 a
Entire State 16,240,7S6 57 2e4,926
Constitutional ratio 16,240,7S6 so 324,816b
1953 Five largest counties 8,131,810 27 301,178
All other counties 6,071,639 31 195,8593
Entire State 14,203,449 53 244,837
Constitutional ratio 14,203,449 so 24,C69
b
1943 Five largest counties 7,233,553 27 267,910
All other counties 5,167,771 29 178,1993
Entire State 12,401,329 6 221,452
Constitutional ratio 12,401,329 50 243,027b
1917 Four largest counties 3,913,622 23 170,157
All other counties 4,145,S93 23 143,M6Sa
Entire State 8,059,515 51 153,030
Constitutional ratio 8,059,515 50 161,19011
1907 Three largest counties 3,417,651 23 143,594
All other counties 3,645,37 28 130,191 a
Entire State 7,062,933 51 133,490
Constitutional ratio 7,062,93; 50 141,260b
1894 Two largest counties 2,292,967 19 120,632
All other counties 3,497,898 31 112,835a
Entire State 5,790,S65 50 115,817b
a = second ratio b = first ratio
Above chart computed from statistics published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 93, pp. 14-15
(1953); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 77-91 (1950), and data on 1960 citizen population
supplied by the U.S. Bureau of Census.
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population for each of these thirty-one senators was only 195,859. Thus,
this second ratio was almost one-third smaller than the constitutional
ratio and was more than one-third smaller than the average citizen
population per senator in the five largest counties. If the senate had been
composed of only fifty members, however, there would have been only
twenty-three seats to distribute among these less populous counties.
Therefore, the second ratio would have been 263,984-only twelve per
cent smaller than the average in the five most populous counties and less
than ten per cent smaller than the constitutional ratio. In other words,
the larger the senate, the greater the difference between the first and
second ratios.
The use of a second and smaller ratio for apportioning senators to the
less populous counties has twice been approved by the court of ap-
peals.25 Indeed, a contrary holding would have made it impossible for the
legislature to adhere to the full ratio rule and to the rules for enlarging
the senate. In the Sherrill case, the court of appeals held that Richmond
could not constitutionally be joined with Queens because the latter had a
full ratio and was, therefore, entitled to its own senator without Rich-
mond. Since Queens had more than a full constitutional ratio, the ques-
tion of a second ratio was not actually involved. Nevertheless, Judge
Chase outlined a procedure for figuring the second ratio and then seemed
to say that this second ratio should be used for apportioning senators
to Queens and all other counties having more than one second ratio but
less than four constitutional or first ratios. 5 3
Since the disparity between the first and second ratios has grown,
some counties are now receiving additional senators on the basis of
full second ratios or major fractions thereof, which do not constitute a
major fraction of the constitutional ratio. In 1943, for example, the
court of appeals approved apportioning three senators to Westchester
on the ground that Westchester had three full second ratios although it
had only 2.2 constitutional ratios.254 In fact, the court said that the first
252. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943); In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81
N.E. 124 (1907).
253. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 209, 81 N.E. 124, 132 (1907). The constitutional ratio
was 141,260; the second ratio, 130,191; Queens, 179,746. Judge Chase listed six other counties
which were "entitled to .. . at least one Senator." Since two of these fell below the
constitutional ratio, they were not alone "entitled to at least one Senator" unless they
were so entitled on the basis of the second ratio: Oneida = 131,393 and Rensselaer
= 118,732. Attorney General Ottinger likewise approved the use of a second ratio for
apportioning senators to all counties having less than four constitutional ratios. 1926 N.Y.
Att'y Gen. Rep. 85-86 (1927).
254. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 213, 218, 52 N.E.2d 97, 101-02, 104 (1943).
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ratio was to be used only for apportioning senators to counties having
more than three full first ratios and that the second ratio was to be used
for apportioning senators to all other counties.2- 5 Consequently, in 1953,
the legislature apportioned three senators to Nassau on 2.3 first ratios,
three to Westchester on 2.1 first ratios, and two to Onondaga on 1.2 first
ratios5 6 Thus, counties actually are receiving an additional senator on
a minor fraction of the constitutional ratio in spite of the statement of the
1894 convention's committee: "[T]hat an additonal senator shall not be
apportioned on less than one-half the ratio, is so manifestly proper that it
demands no explanation. ' 2 7
The 1938 convention proposed that no county alone should be allotted
a senator unless it had at least two-thirds of a ratio.2 s Adoption of
such a provision presumably would not prevent the creation of a multi-
county district that had less than two-thirds of a ratio. If this kind of a
provision had been operative in 1953, interpreted to mean two-thirds
of a first ratio, and applied to second and third senators as well as to a
first senator, then the three additional senators could not have been
apportioned to Nassau, Westchester, and Onondaga. This simply would
have meant that these three senators would have had to be apportioned
to the less populous multi-county districts. While this would be almost
necessary to allow compliance with the 1938 convention's further
proposal that no senate district should contain more than four coun-
ties,2 9 it would also increase the population disparity between the most
and the least populous districts.2CO
Once use of a second ratio is accepted, there arises the question of
whether the apportionment of three senators to a county on the basis of
255. Id. at 213, 52 N.E.2d at 102.
256. Nassau = 3.3 second ratios, Westchester = 3.1 second ratios, and Onondaga
- 1.7 second ratios. See note 144 supra.
257. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1694 of the State of Ner.' York,
Doc. No. 65, at 709 (1900).
25S. Journal of the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1933, Dc. No. 16, p. 50
(1938). The proposal also would have changed the basis of repreentation from citizen
population to votes cast for the governor at the last election.
259. Id. at 49. In 1950, Hubbard urged adoption of the four-county rule. N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 31, p. 73 (1950).
260. This would be the effect of adopting the "two-thirds" rule by itelf. But, ince the
1938 proposal would also have eliminated the provision for enlarging the renate, the
disparity between the first and second ratios theoretically would have been reduced. The
"four county" rule, the "two-thirds" rule, and other such proposals, however, may well
have increased the actual disparity between the most-populous and the least populous
districts even if the difference between the two ratios was reduced.
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the second ratio can be used to enlarge the senate. If so, then a senate of
sixty-one members could have been justified in 1953.20
Since the legislature did not use Nassau's and Westchester's second-
ratio senators as a basis for further enlarging the senate, the Fay case
really did not involve the question of using a second ratio for enlarging
the senate. Nevertheless, Judge Russell "ruled" that the apportionment
of three senators to a county on the basis of the second ratio cannot be
used to enlarge the senate.262 The court of appeals confirmed this part of
Russell's decision by "ruling" that the number of senators apportioned to
counties having three or more first ratios should be compared with the
number allotted to them in 1894. Although the court approved of using
the first ratio for Queens and Nassau together in figuring the size of the
senate, the court held that the second ratio should be used for the actual
apportionment of senators to Nassau since Nassau had less than three
first ratios.263 Thus, the court said that it was proper to use both ratios
in dealing with Nassau-the first ratio to enlarge the senate by an addi-
tional seat and the second ratio to apportion an additional senator to
Nassau.
In summary, the ratio obtained by dividing the State's citizen popula-
tion by fifty is not "the ratio for apportioning senators." Rather, it is a
ratio used for three purposes: (1) for apportioning senators to counties
having three or more full ratios, (2) for enlarging the senate, and
(3) for determining whether a town may be split in the formation of
senate districts.264 "The ratio for apportioning senators" to counties
having less than three constitutional ratios is one that is not even men-
tioned in the constitution but one that the simple laws of arithmetic
required the courts to approve if the four-or-more senator rule and the
provision for enlarging the senate were to be preserved.
261. See note 144 supra.
County 1894 1953 Gain
Queens & Nassau 1 8 + 7
Kings 7 9 +2
New York & Bronx 12 10 -
Westchester 1 3 + 2
Erie 3 3 0
Gain in all counties entitled to three
or more senators on basis of first or
second ratio. ± 11
262. In re Fay, 179 Misc. 1062, 1071-72, 43 N.Y.S.2d 787, 795 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
263. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943).
264. An amendment adopted in 1945 provides that no town, except a town having
more than a full ratio, shall be divided in the formation of senate districts. See N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 31, pp. 14 n.14, 35-37 (1950).
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V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE 1894 FoRi=xuA
Excluding the original apportionment of 1777, the New York State
Senate has been reapportioned or the districts have been redrawn
twenty-two times. Under the first two constitutions, the variation be-
tween the number of representative inhabitants per senator in the most
under-represented district and in the most over-represented district
never exceeded 38.5 per cent except in 1791. Under the third and fourth
constitutions, however, this variation always exceeded forty-two per
cent, and the general trend has been upward.-2 13 While some of this
increased variation under the third constitution may have been due to
gerrymandering and to the creation of single-member districts, most of
this increased variation was made inevitable by certain districting rules
prescribed by the constitution.
Excluding the apportionment of 1917, the variation of 58.1 per cent
in 1879 looks small compared with the variations between the most and
least populous districts since 1894. Even the 1935 legislature, which
sacrificed certain other desiderata in favor of population equality be-
tween districts, proposed an apportionment having a variation of 61.4
per cent. Although a part of these large variations is due to certain
districting rules, most of this increased variation has been caused
by the apportionment rules prescribed by the constitution of 1894.
In 1953, for example, Bronx could be given only four senators although
its citizen population equalled 4.9 ratios, because the constitution forbids
the apportionment of a fifth senator on less than a full ratio. Therefore,
the average senatorial district in Bronx County had to have 344,545
citizen inhabitants. The legislature simply had no discretion in creating
districts in the Bronx which were forty-one per cent more populous than
the statewide average of 244,887. Meanwhile, the second ratio was only
195,859. Under the rulings in the Fay case, the legislature may have had
no discretion about the size of the second ratio.2CO Then, when the
legislature attempted to conform to the various districting rules that
are also prescribed by the constitution, some of the districts would
265. PER ce1r,- or Vns,77or
1st Constitution 2nd Constitution 3rd Constitution 4th Constitution
1791 63.S 1821 9.1 1846 43.2 1S94 60.6
1796 11.1 1326 105 1357 47.8 1905 107.2
1801 3S.5 1836 8.5 1866 47.1 1907 69.7
1S02 12.8 1846 17.6 1879 5S.1 1917 49.9
1808 29.5 1S92 42.4 1943 77.3
Iis 115 1953 SO.S
See notes 112 and 119 supra for an explanation of "per cent of variation.?
266. 291 N.Y. 19S, 218, 52 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1943).
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inevitably be smaller than the second ratio. Thus, the thirty-ninth
district had only 146,666 citizen inhabitants or forty per cent less than
the statewide average. Consequently, the range of variation was almost
eighty-one per cent.267 Or, to put it another way, the citizen population
in an average Bronx district was two and one-third times as large as in
the thirty-ninth district. Even if the districting rules had allowed the
legislature to make the smallest district one that had 195,859 citizen-
inhabitants, this district would still have been forty-three per cent less
populous than the average district in the Bronx. Therefore, even if all
districting rules had been deleted from the constitution, the apportion-
ment rules alone would have required the most populous district to have
at least 344,545 citizen inhabitants and the least populous district to
have no more than 195,859 under the census of 1950.
There are two apportionment provisions that inevitably lead to such
great discrepancies. The first and now less important is the rule re-
quiring the most populous counties to have a full ratio for each
senator 268  The second and more important is the court of appeal's
interpretation of the provision for enlarging the senate.0 9 Not only do
267. SENATE DisTcms UwDER CONSTITUTION OF 1894
Citizen Population per Seat a
Explanation 1894 1906b 1907 1917c 1935d 1943-44 1953-54 1960
Largest
District 156,748 246,187 202,650 194,470 272,614 300,9380 34 4 ,54 5f 425,267J
Smallest
District 86,507 97,717 106,103 115,575 141,631 129,666 146,666 166,715
Variationg 70,241 148,470 96,547 78,895 130,983 171,272 197,879 258,552
Averageh  115,817 138,489 138,489 158,030 213,280 221,452 244,887 284,926
Per cent of
Variation i  60.6 107.2 69.7 49.9 61.4 77.3 80.8 90.7
a 1894-1944 tabulated from statistics published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 77-91
(1950). 1953-1954 tabulated from N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 14-15 (1953).
b Held invalid as was the act of 1916.
c Also act of 1916, which was held invalid.
d Proposed but not passed.
e Queens had a citizen population of 1,203,752 and was given four seats, making a citizen
population of 300,938 per seat.
f Bronx had a citizen population of 1,378,181 and was given four seats, making a citizen
population of 344,545 per seat.
g Difference between largest and smallest district.
h State's total citizen population divided by the number of seats.
I The Variation divided by the Average.
J Nassau had a citizen population of 1,275,801 and will be given three seats, making a
citizen population of 425,267 per seat.
268. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894).
269. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943).
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these two rules create large variations between the most and the least
populous districts, but they also discriminate consistently against the
most populous metropolitan counties and allow the least populous areas
to elect a senatorial majority.2 70
Even if the rule requiring the most populous counties to have a full
ratio for each senator is retained, the disparity between the senatorial
representation of the most populous counties and that of the other
counties could be greatly reduced simply by abolishing the provision
for enlarging the senate.27' This provision, as interpreted by the court
of appeals in the Fay case, means that the greater the population of a
metropolitan county becomes, the more over-represented the less popu-
lous counties become. This is a matter of simple arithmetic. Whenever
the population of one of the most populous counties increases so that it
is entitled to more senators than it had in 1394, these additional
senate seats are not taken from the less populous counties although
the percentage of the state's citizen population in the less populous
counties may actually have decreased. Rather, the number of seats held
by these less populous counties not only remains constant regardless of
their loss of population, but their number of seats actually increases when-
ever New York, Bronx, Kings, or Erie becomes entitled to fewer seats
270. Percentage of citizen population and senators in counties having:
Three or more ratios Less than three ratios
Apportionment Population Senators Population Senators
1960 5S.6 45.6 41.4 54.4
1953 57.3 46.6 42.7 53.4
1943 53.3 48.2 41.7 51.8
1935 57.4 50.0 42.6 50.0
1917 4S.6 45.1 51.4 54.9
1907 48.4 45.1 51.6 54.9
1S94 39.6 38.0 60.4 62.0
All computations were made from statistics published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 77-91
(1950); N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 98, pp. 14-15 (1953); and data on 1960 citizen population
supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The 1935 reapportionment vs propoZed but
not passed.
271. See note 270 supra. Average Number of Citizen Inhabitants Per Senator:
Counties having Remainder of State
Apportionment three or more ratios In 50-member Senate In actual Senate
1960 366,128 280,061 216,822
1953 301,178 263,9S4 195,859
1943 267,910 224,6S6 17,,199
1935 244,SSS 196,814 181,674
1917 170,157 153,552 143,063
1907 143,595 135,012 130,191
1S94 120,632 112,35 112,835
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than it had in 1894.272 Therefore, abolition of the provision for enlarging
the senate would make the most populous counties' senatorial representa-
tion more nearly commensurate with their citizen population. If the act
of 1953, for example, had created a senate of fifty rather than fifty-
eight members, the five counties then having 57.3 per cent of the state's
citizen population (Kings, New York, Queens, Bronx, and Erie) would
have received fifty-four per cent rather than 46.6 per cent of the state's
senators. 3
272. In practice, this provision for enlarging the senate has operated much like the so-
called "Vedder" plan. 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the
State of New York 26 (1900). In the 1891 session of the legislature and again In the
convention of 1894, Senator Commodore P. Vedder introduced a proposal to permanently
preserve the senate districts established by the convention. These districts were not to be
changed except for the formation of new districts within an original district whenever
that district's population increased by a full ratio. If a district's population increased to
three ratios, for example, the district was to be subdivided into three districts without
altering its original boundaries. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of
1894 of the State of New York 1153-154 (1900). Although Charles Z. Lincoln co-
authored the provision for enlarging the senate, he roundly condemned the Vedder plan:
"This plan accentuated the disparity between districts, preserving the smaller and diminish-
ing districts without the possibility of reorganization, and refusing the additional representa-
tion to which the larger districts might have been entitled by reason of their increased
population, and would have required a district to continue to be represented by only one
senator until it had ... [two full ratios of] inhabitants, while a neighboring district, with
a population less than the ratio might also continue to be represented by one senator. This
was a departure from the established policy of dividing the state into senate districts on
the basis of population, and it applied to the senate the principle which lies at the founda-
tion of assembly representation: namely, that each fixed locality [in assembly representa-
tion, the county, and in the senate, district] as then established should be the unit of
representation, and each be entitled to one representative." 2 Lincoln, The Constitutional
History of New York 579 (1905).
273. Per cent of citizen population and of senators
in all counties having three or more ratios:
Actual number Senators
Apportionment of senators Population 50-member senate Actual senate
*1960 *57 58.6 52.0 *45.6
1953 58 57.3 54.0 46.6
1943 56 58.3 54.0 48.2
*1930 *56 57.4 52.0 *46.4
*1925 *54 54.5 50.0 *46.3
1917 51 48.6 46.0 45.1
1907 51 48.4 46.0 45.1
1894 50 39.6 38.0 38.0
1892 a  32 42.9a - 43.8a
* No reapportionment act passed. Apportioned by the author on the basis of the census
in conformity with In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943). Citizen population was
used in all cases.
a Inciudes Richmond, which was combined with Kings, and Putnam and Westchester,
which were combined with New York under the apportionment of 1892.
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Thus, the obvious first step toward making the most populous
counties' senatorial representation proportionate to their population
would be elimination of the provision for enlarging the senate. While
this could best be accomplished by constitutional amendment,- 4 perhaps
the same objective might be accomplished by reinterpreting this con-
stitutional provision. Various possible interpretations of this provision
in 1953 could have yielded a senate ranging from fifty-one to sixty-one
members. If the clause had been held to apply to all counties having
three senators before the reapportionment and if the "additional"
senators had been determined by comparing the number of senators to
which a county was entitled with the number it then had, a senate of fifty-
one members would have resulted.
-27 1
In 1943, the court of appeals approved an interpretation of the
clause that resulted in a senate of fifty-eight in 1953.2-70 But the court
approved this interpretation, in upholding the first reapportionment
that had been made in twenty-seven years. Moreover, the court did not
say that it would not have approved any other interpretation of the
clause. Therefore, if the legislature would interpret the clause in a way
to allow a senate of fifty members after the 1960 census, it is conceivable
that the courts would uphold a reapportionment act based on this inter-
pretation,2 77 and if the legislature follows this interpretation when it
enacts the next reapportionment, the new senate will have fifty members,
274. See notes 173 & 240 supra and accompanying text. Other proposals for repealing
the provision for enlargement of the senate have also been introduced in the Legi-lature. See
notes 70, 242 & 262 supra and accompanying text.
275. County 1943 1953 Gain
Queens 4 5 + 1
Kings 9 9 0
New York 6 6 0
Bronx 5 4 -
Westchester 3 2 -
Erie 3 3 0
Additional senators +1
276. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 19S, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943).
277. County 1953 1960 Census Gain
Nassau 3 3
Queens 5 5 -
Kings 9 7 -
New York 6 4 -
Bronx 4 4 -
Wrestchester 3 2 -
Erie 3 3 -
Additional senators 0
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and the six most populous counties having 58.6 per cent of the state's
citizen population will have fifty-two per cent of the seats in the senate.
While this might be accomplished by statutory construction of the provi-
sion for enlarging the senate, a constitutional amendment would be neces-
sary if the senate were to be made still more representative.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
If the senate is to remain a chamber of less than two hundred mem-
bers without doing violence to the principle of apportionment according
to population, some senatorial districts must continue to be composed of
two or more counties . 78 If two or more counties are to be combined into
one senatorial district, many of the problems relating to senatorial
representation are districting rather than apportionment problems. Two
extremely important apportionment problems are involved, however, in
senatorial representation-problems that must be solved before the
constitution's districting provisions can be intelligently rewritten: First,
the present mandatory rules for senate apportionment and second, the
size of the senate.
The present constitution contains three mandatory rules, which the
legislature must follow in apportioning senators to the most populous
counties. One rule is that "no county shall have more than one-third
of all the senators." Another rule provides that "no two counties or the
territory thereof as . . . organized [in 1894], which are adjoining
counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall have more
than one-half of all the senators. 2 70 These two rules should be excised
278. Seven states give one and only one senator to each county, and thereby have no
popular base for senatorial apportionment: Idaho, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, and South Carolina. The Maryland Constitution does, however, allow
the city of Baltimore to have six senators. 13 Book of the States 1960-1961, at 55-57
(1960). Nine other states also have no real popular base because they have what amounts to
fixed apportionment which, in most cases, can be altered only by constitutional amend-
ments: The Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, and Michigan Senates; for
both houses in Delaware and Mississippi; and for the lower house in Vermont. Id. at
54-57. A number of states have attempted to reconcile the territorial and popular bases by
adopting the so-called federal principle, whereby the apportionment of one house is based
largely on the area while the other has a popular base. California, Illinois, and Michigan
are examples of such states. Id. at 54-57. In the 1915 convention, Edgar T. Brackett made a
similar suggestion, i.e., that the Senate should represent counties while the Assembly should
represent population. 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1915 of the
State of New York 616-17 (1916). Brackett's analogy to the federal House and Senate has
little merit because, unlike the states in the Union, counties are not quasi-sovereign bodies
entitled to political equality in a New York union. On the contrary, they are legal creatures
of the legislature.
279. N.Y. Const. art III, § 4 (1894). See also notes 149 & 150 supra and accompanying
text. Eleven other states also place a maximum on the representation of the more populous
counties or towns. 13 Book of the States 1960-1961, at 54-58 (1960).
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from the constitution because, among other reasons, there never has
been occasion to apply them, and population trends indicate that there
never will be any occasion to apply them. No county ever has been
entitled to one-third of all the senators, and no two counties-adjoining
or otherwise-have ever been entitled to one-half of all the senators.
These two rules arose from a fear that New York and Kings counties
would some day contain a majority of the State's population and elec-
torate.S0 Not only has this fear never been realized, but the number of
inhabitants and the number of voters in New York City are declining
both relatively and absolutely. In short, these two rules are just so much
useless verbiage.
The last mandatory rule provides that "no county shall have four
or more senators unless it shall have a full ratio for each senator."
Like the other two mandatory rules, this rule was designed to limit the
senatorial representation of New York and Kings counties. The fact is,
however, that the rule has operated not only against Bronx, New York,
and Kings, but also against Queens and Erie. Moreover, at the next
reapportionment, it will limit the senatorial representation of Nassau
as well. This rule has been one of the two major causes for growing
population differentials between senate districts. As the suburban
counties grow and become entitled to three or more senators, this rule
will have an increasingly important effect on the senate's representative
character. Therefore, if senators are to be apportioned exactly according
either to the number of people or to the number of popular votes cast,
this rule will have to be excised from the constitution.
The second major cause for population differentials between senatorial
districts is the present constitutional provision for enlarging the senate.2sl
Therefore, if the senate is to accurately reflect either population or
voters, the last fifty-seven words in the third paragraph of article II,
section 4 will also have to be excised122
2S0. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New
York 1255 (1900).
281. "[E]xcept that if any county having three or more senators at the time of any
apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional senator or senators, such
additional senator or senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators,
and the whole number of senators shall be increased to that extent." N.Y. Const. art. HI,
§ 4 (1S94).
282. Ibid. Oklahoma is the only other state to have a stilar provision: "[Tlhe Senate
shall always be composed of forty-four senators, except that in event any county !hall be
entitled to three or more senators at the time of any apportionment such additional senator
or senators shall be given such county in addition to the forty-four senators and the whole
number [of senators shall be increased] to that extent." Okla. Const. art. V, § 9(a). Since
the Oklahoma Senate has never been reapportioned, the State still has forty-four senators, and




If the provision for enlarging the senate and the full ratio rule are
removed from the constitution, an equitable senatorial apportionment
can be made. Senators could then be apportioned to all counties on the
basis of the same ratio-the constitutional ratio. If these two provisions
are not deleted, however, arithmetical necessity will continue to require
the apportionment of senators to the less populous counties on a second
and smaller ratio.
Excision of the provision for enlarging the senate does not mean that
a senate of only fifty members is necessary to give the metropolitan
counties senatorial representation commensurate with their population.
What is required is to apportion senators to all counties on the basis of
the same ratio. This might be accomplished by setting the size of the
senate at fifty or sixty or any other such number, qbtaining the ratio by
dividing the State's population5 3 by that same number, and abolishing
the provision for enlarging the senate beyond that number. One might
well argue that, as long as the provision for enlarging the senate is
eliminated, the senate might well be frozen at a number exceeding
fifty.284 A larger senate would allow the most populous counties to have
their proportionate share of senators without enlarging the territorial
extent of the rural districts. Moreover, the State's growth of population
has been accompanied by a multiplication of social and economic in-
terests. And a larger senate would permit this increased number of
varied interests and points of view to be represented.
Plan Two
A second alternative would be adoption of a constitutional provision
containing a fixed ratio similar to the following: The ratio for apportion-
word "entitled" rather than "having" clarifies which counties are subject to this provision.
However, it is not clear which senators are to be considered "additional senators." If this
clause means in addition to those apportioned in 1907, the 1950 census would have produced
a senate of fifty-four members. If the University of Oklahoma's Bureau of Government
Research is correct in saying that this clause means in addition to the maximum of two
senators apportioned to a county in 1907, then a senate of fifty-one members would be
proper under the 1950 census. Bureau of Government Research (Univ. of Okla.), Legislative
Apportionment in Okla. 10, 12, 27-28 (1956).
283. For the italicized word "population," the words "number of votes cast for assembly-
men at the last two regular elections" may be substituted. The reason for using votes rather
than population as the popular base for apportionment is that non-voters do not bear a
uniform relation to total population in every county.
284. For the text of such a proposal, see 2 New York Constitutional Convention Com-
mittee (1938), Amendments Proposed to the New York Constitution 1895-1937, at 136-37
(1938). Senates in other states range in size from Delaware's seventeen to Minnesota's sixty-
seven. 13 Book of the States 1960-1961, at 37 (1960).
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ing senators shall always be three hundred thousand inhabitants2 5
Each county having one or more full ratios shall be apportioned one
senator for each full ratio or major fraction thereof." " The remaining
counties shall be combined into senatorial districts so that each district
shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants.21t
Plans one and two are both premised on the assumption that county
lines are to be preserved in senatorial districting and apportionment.
Respecting county lines does, of course, make some inequality between
districts inevitable. It is doubtless desirable, nevertheless, to place some
constitutional limit on the degree of inequality that will be permitted.
One possible way of limiting this inequality would be adoption of a
constitutional provision similar to the one suggested by Benjamin S.
Dean in the 1894 convention, to the effect that each senate district shall
be composed of a compact and contiguous territory and shall appro.xi-
mate, with the greatest possible degree of accuracy, the ratio established
by dividing the State's total poplation by the total number of senators. - 3
Such a provision probably would allow some discretion with respect to
what constitutes "the greatest possible degree of accuracy."
If the apportionment agency's discretion is to be placed within more
precise limits, several alternatives are available. One rather minimal
but desirable limitation was contained in a proposed constitutional
amendment first introduced in the assembly more than forty years ago:
"No county nor group of counties shall have more senators than another
county or group of counties having a greater number of inhabit-
ants. .. ,29 A second possible limitation, based on a proposal made by
the 1938 convention, is that no senate district shall contain less than
two-thirds of a ratio or more than one and one-third ratios.-" , This,
however, would still allow one district to be twice as large as another.
That is, it would permit a variation of sixty-seven per cent. While this
235. The italicized words may be replaced by the words "two hundred fifty thousand
votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections." See note 203 supra and
accompanying text.
2S6. For the italicized words, the following may be substituted: "and an additional
senator for a surplus population (or votes) exceeding three-fifths of a ratio." The three-
fifths requirement probably should be substituted if a minimum of four fifths of a ratio is
to be required for the other senatorial districts. See note 294 infra.
287. See note 283 supra and accompanying text.
283. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1394 of the State of Nev,
York 646 (1900) ; see note 283 supra.
289. 2 New York Constitutional Convention Committee of 1933, Amendments Proposed
to the New York Constitution 1S95-1937, at 135 (1933); see note 233 supra.
290. The actual 1933 proposal was that no county alone shall be allotted a senator
unless it contains at least two-thirds of a ratio. Journal of the New York State Constitu-
tional Convention of 193S, Doc. No. 16, at 50 (1933).
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is a smaller variation than that provided in the last two apportionment
acts, eighteen of New York's twenty-two senatorial reapportionments
provided for a smaller variation.2 9'
The inequality between districts could be further restricted by adop-
tion of a provision similar to Missouri's: "[T]he population of no
district shall vary from the . . . [ratio] by more than one-fourth
thereof. ' m292 This would still allow a total variation of fifty per cent-a
larger one than provided in fifteen of New York's twenty-two senatorial
reapportionments.293 A provision similar to the one recently proposed
by Pennsylvania's Constitutional Revision Commission might limit the
inequality between districts to forty per cent 2g4-still a variation
greater than that provided by nine of New York's twenty-two senatorial
reapportionments." 5 The National Municipal League's new Model State
Constitution will provide that no district shall contain a number of
inhabitants that is ten per cent greater or ten per cent less than the
average number of inhabitants in all districts.290 This still means a total
variation of twenty per cent. Although seven of New York's twenty-two
senatorial reapportionments had an even smaller per cent of variation 2 7
adoption of the League's proposal may require modification or excision
of one or more of the districting rules now prescribed in the first para-
graph of article III, section 4. This is a question which cannot be
answered until a thorough districting study has been made. Indeed, such
a study may show that the League's proposal would be an adequate and
desirable substitute for some or all of these districting rules.
Although the League's proposal would still allow one district to
be twenty-two per cent larger than another,"s this is probably the
smallest inequality that can be achieved if county lines are to be
respected in drawing the boundaries of senatorial districts. Various
students of the problem have suggested, however, that county lines
291. See note 265 supra.
292. Mo. Const. art. III, § 7. (Emphasis added.)
293. See note 265 supra.
294. The Pennsylvania proposal might actually allow an even greater variation: "Each
county containing one or more ratios of population shall be entitled to one senator for
each ratio, and to an additional senator for a surplus population exceeding three fifths of
a ratio, but no county shall form a separate district unless it shall contain four fifths of a
ratio, except where the adjoining counties are each entitled to one or more senators, when
such county may be assigned a senator on less than four fifths and exceeding one half of a
ratio." Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision Report 90-91 (1959). The
four-fifths provision apparently does not apply to a multi-county district. A better provision
might be: "No district shall contain less than four fifths of a ratio, except. .. .
295. See note 265 supra.
296. National Municipal League, New York (Jan. 1958).
297. See note 265 supra.
298. That is: 110-90 = 20 and 20-90 = 227.
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should not be obstacles to the creation of equally populated senatorial
districts and that it should be made constitutionally possible to attach
the surplus population in one county to all or part of another county. To
a limited extent, this was actually done under New York's constitution
of 1846. Advocates of this alternative contend that local geographical
areas, even when coextensive with civil or political divisions such as
counties or towns or wards, simply are not communities today. Such
local units, the argument continues, are merely locations of population,
statistical abstractions, lines on a political subdivision map, an indefinite
and amorphous mass of mobile individuals. While it is conceded that a
few very small rural communities may retain the characteristics of a
primary social community, it is contended that even these small rural
units often lack well defined political sentiments. Those who assert this
position conclude that making legislative districts conform to county or
town or ward boundaries is largely an artificial attempt to force people
into an intermittent political community and does not realistically
recognize the multiplicity of individual and group interests present in the
modern community,.Y9 That minimal representation must continue to
be given to traditional units of government, on the other hand, is
conceded even by a number of people whose political interests would be
advanced if representation had a wholly popular base without regard to
any territorial base."Oo
Plai Three
Plan three departs from recent tradition by not requiring county or
town or other traditional geographical boundaries to be followed in
drawing the boundaries of senatorial districts. Adoption of plan three,
however, not only would permit greater population (or voter) equality
between districts but also would make it possible to replace virtually all
of article III, section 4 with a simple districting provision similar to the
following: The State shall be divided into fifty senatorial districts,-^"
each of which shall elect one senator. Each district shall be composed of
contiguous territory and shall be as compact as practicable. No district
shall contain a number of inkabitants that is (three) per cent greater or
299. See, e.g., Hardy, "The California Reapportionment of 1951" pp. 423-25; (unpub-
lished doctoral thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955); Page, "Legislative Ap-
portionment in Kansas" p. 32 (unpublished doctoral thesis in University of Minnezota, 1951);
National Municipal League, Model State Constitution (Jan. 1953).
300. E.g., "Certainly minimal representation must continue to be given to traditional
units of government. But we must get much closer to our basic ideal of one vote for
each citizen with the same weight, regardless of who you are or where you live." DeSapio,
The Case for Reapportionment, Harv. L. Rec. 4 (Oct. 24, 1957). DeSapio's last centence
could, of course, be used to support votes rather than people as the popular base. Sea note
233 supra.
301. See note 284 supra.
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(three) per cent less than the average number of inhabitants in all
districts.
30 2
Adoption of such a provision not only would allow every section of
the state to have its proportionate share of senatorial representation but
would also reduce the verbiage in article III, section 4 by more than
ninety per cent.
Which of these three plans will be preferred depends largely on a
policy decision concerning the weight given to the popular base relative
to the territorial base. Plan three does, of course, give greater weight
to the popular base than do plans one and two. If plan one or plan two
should be selected, then a thorough study of the proper constitutional
limitations to be placed on districting would be in order. If plan three
should be selected, on the other hand, a less thorough districting study
would suffice." 3 While plan three is in harmony with the tradition of
New York's first three constitutions, 30 4 it is certainly a departure from
New York's present one.
Plan Four
Plan four, which is an even greater departure from the present con-
stitution, is patterned after the Alaska, Hawaii, and Illinois plans. The
Illinois constitutional amendment of 1954, for example, divides the state
into three regions or types of areas for purposes of senatorial apportion-
ment: the City of Chicago, the remainder of Cook County, and the
downstate.30 5 Similarly, the constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii each
divide their respective States into four major geographic regions for
purposes of apportioning members of the lower house. Members are
first apportioned to each of these basic regions. 0 In Hawaii, for ex-
ample, one member is assigned to each of the four regions. The remain-
ing forty-seven members are then distributed among the four regions
according to the method of equal proportions. 0 7 Once this is done, the
302. See note 283 supra.
303. The State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision and Simplification
of the Constitution concentrated its attention on apportionment but did not make a district-
ing study. N.Y. Leg. Doec. No. 33 (1960).
304. See notes 120 & 121 supra.
305. Juergensmeyer and Sokolow, The Campaign for the Illinois Reapportionment
Amendment (mimeographed, University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public
Affairs) 49 (1957); Steiner and Gove, The Legislature Redistricts Illinois (mimeographed,
University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs) 5-7 (1956).
306. Hawaii Const. art. III, § 4, in H.R. Rep. No. 32, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1959);
S. Rep. No. 80, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1959); Alaska Legislative Council, Legislative
Districting and Apportionment in Alaska (Staff Memo. No. 8) 4-6, 30-34 (1956).
307. For an explanation of equal proportions, the method used for apportioning seats
in the United States House of Representatives among the states, see Chafee, Reapportion-
ment of the House of Representatives Under the 1950 Census, 36 Cornell L.Q. 643 (1951) ;
Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 302 (1952).
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members apportioned to each region are then apportioned to the various
districts (or counties) in that region by the same method of equal pro-
portions.
This plan could be adapted to the New York scene, first, by dividing
the State into four groups of counties similar to the classification used
by the United States Bureau of the Census."" The senators might then
be apportioned among the four groups according to a modern apportion-
ment method such as major fractions or equal proportions.2 3 The third
step would be to distribute the senators apportioned to the New York
City suburban area to one or more subgroups of contiguous counties.
At present, this would mean distributing ten senators among two sub-
groups. This might also be done according to the formula of major
fractions.31 This third step would involve distributing the senators ap-
portioned to the metropolitan counties upstate among the various
standard metropolitan areas in these counties. At present, this would
mean the distribution of twelve senators among six standard metropolitan
areas: The Albany-Schenectady-Troy, Binghamton, Buffalo, Rochester,
308. (1) The five counties of New York City.
(2) The New York City suburban area (Nassmu, Rockland, Suffoll, and
Westchester).
(3) Ten metropolitan counties upstate (Albany, Broome, Erie, Herkimer, Mfonroe,
Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Rensselaer, and Schenectady).
(4) The forty-three remaining counties.
For an explanation of major factions, see Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment
Problem, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 290 (1952). See also Schmeckebier, The Method of
Equal Proportions, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. at 310 (1952).
309. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960 vol. I, pt. A, 34-1 to
34-40 (1961). An apportionment of sixty senators on the basis of the 1960 population




Area Senators Population par Senator
New York City 28 7,731,9&4 277,923
N.Y.C. suburban area 10 2,912,649 291,265
10 metropolitan counties upstate 12 3,428,211 235,6S4
43 remaining counties 10 2,659,460 265,946
New York State 6O 16,7S2,304 279,70S
310. Number Number of
of Inhabitants
Counties Senators Population par Senator
Nassau & Suffolk 7 1,965,955 20,994
Rockland & Westchester 3 946,694 315,231
N.Y.C. suburban area 10 2,912,649 291,265
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Syracuse, and Rome-Utica standard metropolitan areas.3 11 The fourth
and final step involves dividing each multi-senator group or subgroup
or area into a number of districts equal to the number of senators
apportioned to that group or subgroup or area. At present, that would
mean dividing New York City into twenty-eight districts, Nassau and
Suffolk into seven, Rockland and Westchester into three, Albany and
Rensselaer and Schenectady into two, Erie and Niagara into five, Monroe
into two, and the forty-three non-metropolitan counties into ten districts.
In order to prevent or at least restrict gerrymandering, certain districting
rules probably should be adopted. In the absence of a thorough districting
study, two may be tentatively suggested: (1) the rule of contiguity and
compactness, and (2) a percentage limit on the deviation from the average.
Plan Four may be embodied in a constitutional provision similar to
the following:
The senate shall always be composed of (sixty) senators, who shall be
elected in single-member districts. All of the State's counties shall be
divided into four groups: (1) New York City, (2) the other counties in
the New York City standard metropolitan area, (3) the counties in the
other standard metropolitan areas, and (4) the remaining counties, as these
last three groups are defined by the United States Government at the time
of the last preceding federal census. One senator shall be assigned to
each group. The remaining fifty-six senators shall be apportioned among
the four groups on the basis of the number of inhabitants in each group
according to the method of major fractions.
The senators apportioned to the New York City suburban area shall
then be distributed among two or more subgroups of counties according
to the method of major fractions. Each subgroup shall be composed of
contiguous counties. One senator shall be assigned to each of the other
standard metropolitan areas. The remaining senators apportioned to
these areas shall be distributed among said areas according to the method
of major fractions.
311. A distribution of these senators by applying the major fractions formula to 1960
population statistics would yield the following distribution:
Number Number of
of Inhabitants
Counties Senators Population per Senator
Albany, Rensselaer, & Schenectady 2 568,407 284,204
Broome 1 212,661 212,661
Erie & Niagara 5 1,306,957 261,391
Monroe 2 586,387 293,194
Onondaga 1 423,028 423,028
Oneida & Herkimer 1 330,771 330,771
Standard metropolitan areas upstate 12 3,428,211 285,684
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New York City shall be divided into a number of senatorial districts
equal to the number of senators apportioned to said city. Each subgroup
of other counties in the New York City standard metropolitan area shall
be divided into a number of senatorial districts equal to the number of
senators to which that subgroup shall be entitled. Each of the other
standard metropolitan areas shall be divided into a number of senatorial
districts equal to the number of senators to which that area shall be
entitled. The remaining counties shall be divided into a number of
senatorial districts equal to the number of senators to which said counties
shall be entitled. Each district shall be composed of a contiguous
territory and shall be as compact as practicable. No district shall contain
a number of inhabitants that is (three) per cent greater or (three) per
cent less than the average number of inhabitants in all districts in that
group, subgroup, or area as the case may be. "'-
Although plan four must necessarily be more verbose than the other
three plans discussed, it is brief compared to article III, section 4 of the
present constitution. Although plan four requires greater inequality be-
tween districts than plan three would permit, this inequality is much
greater than the present apportionment rules require. The great merit
in plan four is that it deals realistically with the metropolitan develop-
ment, which is more of a "community" than most counties are. Plan
three, however, would also allow the metropolitan development to be
treated as a unit. Therefore, if the choice were between these two plans,
plan three should be preferred for two reasons: it permits less in-
equality between districts than plan four requires; and it is simpler and
less verbose.
Plan Five
There is a fifth and final alternative for senatorial apportionment.
This plan provides for the apportionment of one senator to each of the
sixty-two counties and for the weighting of each senator's vote in the
senate according to the population in his county or according to the
number of popular votes cast in his county at the last two regular sena-
torial elections. If each senator's vote were weighted on the basis of
population, the senator from the least populous county would have one
vote. Every other senator's vote would be weighted by dividing the
population of that senator's county by the population of the least
populous county. Hamilton is now the least populous county. Therefore,
Hamilton's senator would have one vote in the senate. In 1960, for ex-
ample, Hamilton's population was 4,267 while Bronx had a population
of 1,424,815. Since Bronx's population was 334 times that of Hamilton,
Bronx's senator would be entitled to cast 334 votes in the senate.
312. See note 283 supra and accompanying text.
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Similarly, a senator's vote could be weighted according to the number
of popular votes cast in his county at the last two regular senatorial
elections. The fewest popular votes cast in any one county in the 1958
and 1960 senatorial elections were cast in Hamilton County. While only
5,245 popular votes were cast for senator in these two elections in
Hamilton, 463,805 were cast in Suffolk. Therefore, Hamilton's senator
would be entitled to one vote in the senate while Suffolk's senator would
be entitled to eighty-eight.3 13 One objection to this particular weighting
system is that high electoral participation by the minority party's sup-
porters in a county simply would enhance the other party's strength
in the legislature. This would, of course, encourage the minority party
in any given county to boycott the senatorial election.
Therefore, a better system might well be to increase the number of
senators to 124, giving one senator to each of the two major parties in
each of the State's sixty-two counties and weighting each senator's vote
in the senate according to the number of popular votes cast for his party's
candidate in his county at the last two regular senatorial elections.
The fewest popular votes cast for a major party's senatorial candidate
in any one county in the last two senatorial elections were cast for the
Democratic candidate in Hamilton County. Since 1,461 popular votes
were cast for the Democratic senatorial candidate while 3,748 were cast
for the Republican candidate in Hamilton in the 1958 and 1960 elec-
tions, Hamilton's Democratic senator would have one vote in the senate
while Hamilton's Republican senator would have 2.6 votes. Similarly,
since 1,461 popular votes were cast for the Democratic candidate in
Hamilton while 195,098 were cast for the Democratic candidate and
268,707 were cast for the Republican candidate in Suffolk in the 1958
and 1960 elections, Hamilton's Democratic senator would have one vote
in the senate while Suffolk's Democratic senator would have 133.5, and
Suffolk's Republican senator would have 183.9 votes. While various
other weighting systems have been suggested, they have not been dis-
cussed here, because not only are they a great deal more complicated,
but they also require the use of a proportional or semi-proportional
electoral system.314
The merit of weighting a senator's vote in the senate according to
the popular vote cast at the last two senatorial elections is that it pro-
vides what amounts to an automatic biennial reapportionment. Re-
equalizations are not made once a decade on the basis of obsolete census
returns but every two years on the basis of votes, many of which were
313. 463,805 divided by 5,245 equals 88. N.Y. Leg. Manual 1093, 1100 (1959). The
1960 election statistics supplied by the New York Secretary of State.
314. See Engle, Weighting Legislators' Votes to Equalize Representation, 12 Western
Pol. Q. 442 (1959).
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cast only two months before the senate convenes. Moreover, if a senator's
vote were weighted on the basis of the votes cast only for his party's
senatorial candidate in the last two elections, weighting would stimulate
voter participation at senatorial election, for each voter would know
that his senator's weight in the senate would depend on his casting a
vote at the popular election.3 11
The merit of a system of weighted votes such as the ones discussed
in plan five is that the system is arithmetically simple, easy to under-
stand, respects county lines, provides equitable representation with
mathematical precision, and solves all senatorial apportionment and
districting problems by making senatorial reapportionment and redistrict-
ing unnecessary. It is impossible to divide the State into districts equal
in population or in the number of voters if adjustments must usually be
made by adding or withdrawing entire towns or counties. Weighting
automatically corrects this inequality with precision. It allows the
second major party in every county, however small, to have a spokesman
in the senate. Weighting would greatly reduce the natural bias against
reapportionment. Since no senator would be voting to reapportion him-
self or a colleague or a fellow partisan out of the senate, there doubtless
would be less resistance to reweighting than to reapportionment. More-
over, the formula is so simple that the function of reweighting would
involve no discretion and could be vested in an officer of the senate or
in an executive officer. Then, reweighting could be compelled by manda-
mus. This, in turn, would eliminate the need for compulsory devices
designed to compel reapportionment. Similarly, a weighting system
would eliminate the need for remedies for misapportionment, malappor-
tionment, and gerrymandering. Weighting would make gerrymandering
pointless and useless. Finally, weighting each senator's vote would reduce
the number of periodic reapportionments from two to one-a reappor-
tionment of assemblymen.
Defenders of a weighting system propose to weight a senator's vote
only on legislative enactments-that is, only on those measures that
would enact law and establish state policy and on those procedural
matters that would advance bills toward enactment. They point out that
a great deal of a senator's work is on committees, where much of his
work involves editing, investigating, report-writing, and the like as
distinguished from establishing policies. No one proposes to extend the
weighting system to a senator's committee work-only to votes on con-
troversial policy measures. Only in votes enacting policies for the State
315. This and the four following paragraphs are based largely on Engle, Weighting
Legislators' Votes to Equalize Representation, 12 Western Pol. Q. 442-46 (1959). See alo
Hardy, "The California Reapportionment of 1951," p. 427 (unpublished doctoral thesL,
University of California at Los Angeles 1955).
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would weighted votes be used to register the relative number of people
(or popular votes cast) in each county. This, of course, is a real weakness
of plan five. The nine or ten most populous counties having more than
sixty per cent of the population and electorate would have only eighteen
or twenty of the 124 senators to serve on committees. This weakness
could be overcome, of course, by giving two senators to each major party
in each of these most populous counties and allowing each of these
senators a vote equal to only one-half the weight that the senator's vote
would have if he were his party's lone senator from his county.
Proponents of a weighting system argue that the system is not new,
that there is ample precedent for such a plan. They point out that, at
corporation meetings, each shareholder votes the number of shares he
owns or for which he holds proxies. Similarly, labor union federation
delegates vote the membership strength of their respective unions. In
many political organizations, a similar weighting system is employed.
Illinois law, for example, provides that each member of a party committee
shall have one vote for each ballot cast in his district by his party's
primary electors.316 In conclusion, it has been argued: "Either the votes
of legislators must be weighted ...to equalize the representation of
the people, or the people themselves are necessarily weighted .... M17
Adoption of one of the five plans discussed or of a plan similar to one
of them will be necessary if the senate is to actually represent either
people or voters as they are or may be distributed throughout the State.
Adoption of any one of the five plans would, of course, require a con-
stitutional amendment. The senate can be made much more representa-
tive than it is today without resort to constitutional amendment, however,
by statutory reinterpretation of the last fifty-seven words in the third
paragraph of article III, section 4 of the present constitution.
316. I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 46, § 7-8(d) (Smith-Hurd 1944).
317. Engle, Weighting Legislators' Votes to Equalize Representation, 12 Western Pol. Q.
442, 444 (1959).
